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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
In a large police department, such as one in a large munici-
pality or a state police agency, law enforcement officials must
simultaneously respond to a myriad of "crisis" situations. Some
of the situations police encounter will involve serious criminal-
ity, while others will involve only civil concerns. One officer may
be responding to a report of a possible burglary in progress in a
residence, while another responds with firefighters to the scene
of a fire in a commercial structure, and a third to a street loca-
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tion where an unattended child wanders aimlessly. The first of-
ficer may enter the residence to find no burglar or any other
person, but rather a faulty alarm system and, more interestingly,
numerous marijuana plants belonging to the absent home-
owner. The second officer may be examining a fire of suspi-
cious origin and finding evidence of arson, which will eventually
lead to uncovering an elaborate scheme involving arson for in-
surance fraud committed by the building's owner. The third of-
ficer may identify the unattended child and, in an effort to
return the child to his or her home, discover that the child has
been abandoned days earlier, with nothing to eat, by irresponsi-
ble parents. The first officer has discovered evidence of the il-
licit production of cannabis, the second evidence of arson for
fraud, and the third evidence of criminal child neglect. The de-
fendants charged with these respective crimes may eventually
challenge the presence of the police in their private premises
and the police discovery of evidence of their criminality. Each
defendant may claim the evidence of their criminality was seized
in violation of their constitutional rights and may challenge the
admissibility of such evidence in their respective prosecutions.
Police may counter that they were properly responding to an
emergency when they inadvertently discovered evidence of a
crime. This Article will examine this type of police activity, evi-
dence of criminality seized as a result, and defense challenges of
the evidence based on Fourth Amendment grounds.'
B. IMPORTANCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE AND THE WARRANT
REQUIREMENT
The United States Supreme Court has held that normally, a
police seizure of either evidence of a crime in a constitutionally
protected area or a possible criminal defendant must be based
'This article will not explore the extent to which emergency circumstances justify
certain police action challenged on grounds other than the Fourth Amendment. See,
e.g., Benson v. State, 698 So.2d 383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (police not required to
administer Miranda warnings before asking in-custody suspect questions about con-
trolled substance he swallowed upon police approach since questions were aimed at
addressing a possible life-threatening emergency); State v. Bernier, 700 A.2d 680
(Conn. App. Ct. 1997) (state fire marshall's analysis of evidence of arson, earlier re-




on probable cause.2 Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly
stated that a government search or seizure on private premises
without a warrant is presumptively unreasonable3 under the
Fourth Amendment4 unless it falls within one of the "carefully
delineated"5 exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant
clause.6 Strong policy interests in preventing possible abuse by
government agents support the Court's insistence that govern-
ment searches and seizures be preceded by the judicial scrutiny
needed to procure a warrant. As the Supreme Court has stated,
The purpose of a warrant is to allow a neutral judicial officer to as-
sess whether the police have probable cause to make an arrest or con-
duct a search.
As we have often explained, the placement of this checkpoint be-
tween the Government and the citizen implicitly acknowledges that an
"'officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime' . . . may lack sufficient objectivity to weigh correctly the strength
of the evidence supporting the contemplated action against the individ-
ual's interests in protecting his own liberty and the privacy of his home."7
See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (probable cause determination in-
volves examination of "totality of circumstances"--including veracity of informant,
basis of knowledge, and corroborative information-sufficient to establish a "fair
probability" that evidence of a crime is in a particular location; probable cause is nec-
essary for issuance of a search warrant); Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560
(1971) (probable cause necessary for issuance of arrest warrant); Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41 (1967) (probable cause necessary for court authorized electronic eaves-
dropping of conversations); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967) (probable cause necessary for issuance of administrative warrant authorizing
administrative inspection of residence). United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411
(1967) (arrest in public requires probable cause although not a warrant); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (search of automobile requires probable cause al-
though not a warrant).
3 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971) (plurality).
"U.S. CONSr. amend. IV.
'Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1984) (quoting United States v. United
States District Court 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972) ("Prior decisions of this Court... have
emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are 'few in number and care-
fully delineated' . . . and that the police bear a heavy burden when attempting to
demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches and arrests.")).
6 See infra notes 12-22 and accompanying text.
'Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981) (citing Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). ,
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The United States Supreme Court has expressed a "prefer-
ence" that searches and seizures be supported by a judicial war-
rant based on probable cause s and have held unconstitutional a
variety of searches that were not supported by a warrant.9 On
the other hand, the Court has approved a substantial number of
searches on less than probable cause; namely, some on the basis
of a reasonable suspicion'0 and others on no individualized sus-
picion whatsoever." In addition, the Court has recognized a
number of exceptions to the warrant requirement, 2 namely,
a United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105 (1965) (deliberate determinations of
magistrates empowered to issue warrants are to be preferred over the hurried action
of law enforcement officers acting without warrants).
9 Steagal4, 451 U.S. at 204 (search of home for arrestee named in search warrant
unconstitutional since home belonged to third party and police had no search war-
rant authorizing search of latter person's home); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1 (1977) (warrantless search of foot locker which had been seized from drug courier
but which was in officer's exclusive control when opened unconstitutional); Vale v.
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970) (search of home for illicit drugs unconstitutional since
no search warrant); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search of defendant's
entire home following defendant's arrest unconstitutional since no search warrant
and because search outside scope of "search incident to arrest" doctrine); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (administrative search of home by municipal
building inspector unconstitutional in absence of administrative search warrant); See
v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (administrative search of locked commercial
warehouse by fire department inspector unconstitutional in absence of administrative
search warrant); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (warrantless monitoring of
private conversations in public telephone booth, which implicated defendant in ille-
gal gambling, unconstitutional); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (search of
defendant's hotel room for evidence of armed robbery unconstitutional since no
search warrant and because hotel clerk had no authority to consent to search).
"See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (warrantless search of proba-
tioner's house by probation officer on basis of "reasonable grounds" upheld);
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (public employer's work-related search of
public employee's workplace could be carried out on an individualized suspicion
rather than probable cause); NewJersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (search of high
school student's purse on basis of reasonable suspicion upheld); Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648 (1979) (ordinary stop of motor vehicle on public thoroughfare requires
reasonable and articulable suspicion); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (investigatory
stop and frisk of suspect for weaponry on basis of reasonable suspicion upheld).
" Vernonia School District v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (warrantless, suspicionless
drug testing of public school athletes upheld); Michigan Department of State Police
v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990)(suspicionless roadblock stops of automobiles to snare
drunk drivers upheld).
"justice Scalia stated in a concurring opinion that one commentator catalogued
nearly twenty exceptions, "including searches incident to arrest, automobile searches,
border searches, administrative searches of regulated businesses, exigent circum-
stances, search[es] incident to nonarrest when there is probable cause to arrest, boat
1999] 437
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exigent circumstances, 3 hot pursuit,14 searches incident to an
arrest, 5 seizures of items in plain view
I searches of vehicles, 17
inventory searches,8 consent searches,' 9 border searches,0
searches on the high seas,2 1 and searches of heavily regulated
businesses to assure compliance with government regulations
that are designed to protect the public's health and safety.2 Fi-
nally, the Court has ruled that when police are engaged in
"community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the de-
tection, investigation or acquisition of evidence relating to the
violation of a criminal statute,"2 the normal probable cause
standard and warrant requirement need not be satisfied before
their caretaking functions commence.24 Examples of commu-
nity caretaking functions include examining an automobile that
was disabled or in an accident,2 and inventorying an im-
pounded car for safekeeping purposes.2 6 This article will ex-
plore the community caretaking doctrine and propose that the
boarding for document checks, welfare searches, inventory searches, airport searches,
and school searches." See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582-83 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (citing Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH.
L. REv. 1468, 1473-74 (1985)). Scalia indicated since Bradley published his article,
the Court had approved two more exceptions: searches of mobile homes and
searches of government employees. Id.
's See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (not practical to procure
warrant to remove blood from a drunk driver given inevitable dissipation of driver's
blood alcohol level).
14 See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967).
15 See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218 (1973).
" See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
V See, e.g., Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 565; California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1987).
'8 See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364 (1976).
19 See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973).
2 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985); United States v.
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
" United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
2New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
' Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).
24 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 371-76 (1976).
2Cady, 413 U.S. at 441.
2Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987).
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doctrine provides the analytical framework for evaluating
searches and seizures incident to an emergency. This article
proposes that when police officers act in response to an emer-
gency, or in their community caretaking capacity, probable
cause is not relevant and a judicial warrant is not needed. In
other words, government actions carried out in response to an
emergency should be viewed as an exception to normal Fourth
Amendment standards because these actions are not considered
a search or seizure as contemplated by the Fourth Amendment.
The United States Supreme Court has alluded to another
possible doctrine or exception to the general rule that law en-
forcement authority's actions must be predicated on probable
cause and a warrant, namely, an "emergency," " without neces-
sarily describing it as such.2 However, the Court and the legal
literature2 have paid scant attention to the growing willingness
of the nation's lower courts to recognize this doctrine or excep-
tion. The purpose of this article is two-fold. First, it explores a
substantial body of caselaw that has addressed governmental
claims that law enforcement actions were justified by what could
simply be described as an emergency. This review will reveal,
not only differences between jurisdictions as to what type of cir-
cumstances are properly classified as emergencies permitting,
for instance, a warrantless entry into a residence, but will also
reveal rather dramatic differences in the method of analysis
which the judiciary utilized in assessing the constitutionality of
these types of governmental actions in the face of a Fourth
See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 587 U.S. 523, 539 (1967) (plurality opin-
ion) ("[N)othing we say today is intended to foreclose prompt inspections, even when
without a warrant, that the law has traditionally upheld in emergency situa-
tions.") (emphasis added); See also Cady, 413 U.S. at 447-48 ("[C]oncem for the safety
of the general public who might be endangered if an intruder removed a revolver
from the trunk of... [an impounded] vehicle... was not unreasonable solely be-
cause a warrant had not been obtained.").
" See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) ("A burning building clearly
presents an exigency of sufficient proportions to render a warrantless entry 'reason-
able.'").
See RonaldJ. Bacigal, The Emgency Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 9 U. RICH.
L. REv. 249 (1975); Edward G. Mascolo, The Emergency Doctrine Fxception to the Warrant
Requirement Under the Fourth Amendment, 22 BUFF. L REV. 419 (1972); Note, The Emer-




Amendment challenge. As to the former, the case law reveals
surprisingly little insight into such basic questions as whether an
emergency requires a threat to life or limb or whether a mere
threat to property interests is sufficient. As to the latter point,
some courts rely on a simple, if not simplistic, "reasonableness"
analysis which only inquires as to whether the governmental ac-
tion was appropriate given the surrounding circumstances,3°
while others employ a more sophisticated multi-factor test for
determining the validity of an emergency claim."
The second, and more important, goal of this article is to
offer a doctrinal model that will assist courts in determining
whether an emergency existed sufficient to validate a law en-
forcement agent's actions that now are being questioned. Ini-
tially, it will note the United States Supreme Court's recognition
of the "community caretaking" role of the police that is, on the
one hand, an essential characteristic of police work and, on the
other hand, the type of activity that should not be saddled with
the criminal procedure requirements that police must satisfy when
they are investigating a crime and gathering evidence. Further,
it will argue this "community caretaking" concern of police pro-
vides a principled framework for validating police action carried
out in the name of an emergency. Next, a three-prong test will
be used to guide courts through the thorny questions of when
certain questionable police actions qualify as justifiable emer-
gency actions. Specifically, the first prong of this three-part test
requires that there must be an objectively reasonable basis for a
belief in the immediate need for police assistance for the pro-
tection of human life or substantial property interests. The sec-
ond prong of this test insists that the officer's actions must be
-o See, e.g., State v. Brimage, 918 S.W.2d 466, 501 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ("We have
used an objective standard of reasonableness in determining whether a warrantless
search is justified under the emergency doctrine. This objective standard of reason-
ableness used in evaluating the police's conduct takes into account the facts and cir-
cumstances known to the police at the time of the search.").
- See, e.g., People v. Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1976) (guidelines for emer-
gency doctrine are: (1) police must have reasonable grounds to believe there is an
emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of
life or property;, (2) the search must not be primarily motivated by an intent to arrest
and seize evidence; and (3) there must be some basis to associate the area or place
where the emergency occurred with the responsive police action).
[Vol. 89440
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motivated by an intent to aid or protect, rather than to solve a
crime. The third prong demands that the police action in ques-
tion fall within the scope of the emergency.
The review of existing caselaw and the three-prong test,
which this article argues should be uniformly employed in
evaluating government actions claimed to be justified because
of emergency considerations, will be presented simultaneously
throughout the article. This approach is better suited to identi-
fying the contrasts between some courts' resolution of emer-
gency claims and the three-part test supported by this author
than would a mere descriptive survey of the various opinions
thereafter followed by this author's set of recommendations. It
is the hope of the author that, in the end, this article will clarify
one aspect of the very complicated puzzle referred to as Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.
C. "EMERGENCY" VERSUS "EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES": A QUESTION
OF NOMENCLATURE
It is important to note that various courts have character-
ized as an "exigency" or the "exigent circumstances" concept
what this article will, for the sake of clarity, refer to as an "emer-
gency," the "emergency doctrine," or the "emergency excep-
tion" to the warrant requirement.3 2 Some decisions refer to the
so-called "exigent circumstances" exception to the warrant
clause as a general exception, which encompasses a variety of
" See, e.g., Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 293 (1984) (plurality opinion) ("A
burning building of course creates an exigency thatjustifies a warrantless entry by fire
officials to fight the blaze."); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) ("A burning
building clearly presents an exigency of sufficient proportions to render a warrantless
entry 'reasonable.'").
The United States Supreme Court not only has described police actions that have
little or nothing to do with their law enforcement functions as an "exigency" that ex-
cuses the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, but also have referred to police
collection of evidence of a crime, in one case where there existed insufficient time to
procure a warrant, as an "emergency" that justified warrantless police action.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (police officer who took drunk driv-
ing arrestee to hospital for immediate removal of blood "was confronted with an
emergency, in which the delay to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threat-
ened the destruction of [high blood-alcohol] evidence").
1999]
other warrant exceptions, such as the automobile exception."
This school of thought would view an emergency situation as a
category or variant of exigent circumstances." For example, in
United States v. Johnsons the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit described a burglary in progresse as a situation
where "exigent circumstances" existed which validated federal
agents' warrantless entry into private premises and their obser-
vation of what appeared to be bomb-making materials therein.
There, the court found that the police entry and protective
sweep of the premises for burglars "was warranted in order to
ensure the security of the owner's property."m Similarly, in Peo-
ple v. Higbee,9 the Supreme Court of Colorado indicated that the
presence of explosive devicesO gave rise to what it deemed "exi-
gent circumstances," which authorized municipal police entry
and search of an apartment for such devices given the "threat of
life or safety posed by the alleged explosive device."4' Mean-
while, in United States v. Warner,4 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the presence of certain
inherently volatile chemicals4 in a private garage did not create
" See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 (1991) (quoting Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158-59 (1925)) ("[Carroll] held that a warrantless search
of an automobile based upon probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained
evidence of a crime in the light of an exigency arising out of the likely disappearance
of the vehicle did not contravene the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment.").
See, e.g., People v. Malczewski, 744 P.2d 62, 66 (Colo. 1987) ("[Tlhe emergency
variant of the exigent circumstances exception requires a showing of an immediate
crisis inside the [place to be searched] and the probability that police assistance will
be helpful in alleviating that crisis.").
9 F.3d 506 (6th Cir. 1993).
6See infra Part IU.A.2.i for discussion of case law which views a burglary in progress
as a situation where police can conduct a warrantless entry into premises.
37johnson, 9 F.3d at 511.
Id. at 510.
"802 P.2d 1085 (Colo. 1990).
4o See infra Part m.A2.k for discussion of case law which views the presence of ex-
plosive devices as a situation where police can conduct a warrantless entry into prem-
ises.
41 Higbe 802 P.2d at 1090.
42 843 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1988).
4' See infra Part I.A.2.1 for discussion of case law which views the presence of ether
or other volatile chemicals as a situation where police can conduct a warrantless entry
into premises.
442 JOBN- DEKE [Vol. 89
EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES
"exigent circumstances" permitting police entry into the prem-
ises to "protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury" when the
officer knew the chemicals in question had been present in the
garage in the summer heat for the past two weeks without inci-
dent.4 Thus, the officer's seizure of various materials used by
the defendant in the manufacture of controlled substances
within his garage violated the Fourth Amendment.4 Likewise,
in Parkhurst v. Trapp,46 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit held that where police entered a home a sec-
ond time following an earlier report of a kidnapping,47 their
warrantless entry was not justified by "exigent circumstances"
because (1) the alleged victim of the kidnapping was a child
whose father, the alleged kidnapper, had court-ordered joint
custody of the child, (2) the police had entered the father's
home a first time, arrested him for a violation of the court or-
der, and taken him into custody where he remained when they
entered his home a second time, and (3) during the first entry
the police did not find the child, but instead found a note
which indicated the father's mother (or child's grandmother)
had taken the child to another location.4 s Here, no basis existed
for believing the child was placed in "imminent danger" by any-
one, especially the incarcerated father; thus, the second entry
into the father's residence was unconstitutional.
Notwithstanding the broad definition of "exigent circum-
stances" utilized in some of the cases discussed immediately
above, this article will follow the approach taken in numerous
other cases, where the court refers to an immediate threat to a
person or substantial property interest as an "emergency." Ac-
cordingly, further discussion of the subject that is the focus of
this article will make reference to the "emergency doctrine" or
the "emergency exception" to the Fourth Amendment warrant
44 Warner, 843 F.2d at 404.45id.
4 77 F.3d 707 (3rd Cir. 1996).
4 See infra Part IIA.2.c for discussion of case law which views a kidnapping as a
situation where police can conduct a warrantless entry into premises.
Parkhur, 77 F.3d at 711-12.
4' Id. at 712. This case was a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the father
against the police.
1999]
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clause. "Exigent circumstances" will be understood to cover
only those situations where the police take warrantless action
due to their reasonable belief that there exists a serious poten-
tial for the destruction of evidence of a crime should they take
the time to procure a warrant.0 An "emergency" will refer to
those situations where police act to aid or protect human life or
to protect substantial property interests as part of their "com-
munity caretaking" function.51 Parenthetically, others might de-
scribe these situations as a "civil emergency" or the general
concept discussed in this article as the "civil emergency" doc-
trine. 2 This, too, is simplistic because a police response to an
assault in progress or a burglary in progress is not merely a civil
matter.
In addition, the position I propose, which refuses to view
most or all of the various warrant exceptions as a sub-category of
exigent circumstances, is in accord with several United States
Supreme Court decisions. For example, in United States v. Ram-
sey," the Court ruled that the "border search" exception was not
based on the doctrine of "exigent circumstances" but rather is a
long-standing, historically recognized exception to the Fourth
' See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (warrantless removal of
blood from defendant suspected of drunk driving valid where there existed probable
cause to believe defendant's blood-alcohol level exceeded the legal limit and pro-
curement of warrant would have resulted in dissipation of the blood-alcohol evi-
dence); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (unannounced and warrantless entry of
premises by police to seize marijuana permissible given the need to prevent destruc-
tion of the contraband).
"' Virginia's Court of Appeals has acknowledged "that in the context of a warrant-
less entry and search, little, if any, distinction exists in Virginia law between the cir-
cumstances governing the application of the community caretaking doctrine and
those governing the application of the 'emergency' exception to the warrant re-
quirement." Wood v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d. 627, 630 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
However, this article views the community caretaking concept as a broader con-
cept, encompassing concerns such as inventories, which do not involve the immedi-
acy aspect of an emergency. In other words, both the community caretaking and
emergency doctrines have in common the government interest in protecting life or
property. On the other hand, community caretaking does not carry the degree of ur-
gency normally associated with an emergency. Thus, a police officer will not normally
be required to interrupt a coffee-break to perform an automobile inventory but will
most likely be required to do so to respond to a person in need of medical treatment.
12JAmmS B. HADDAD ETAL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 432-33 (4th ed. 1992).
"431 U.S. 606 (1977).
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Amendment's general principal that warrants are required for
searches and seizures." So too, in United States v. Santana,5 the
Court noted a difference between the "exigency" exception and
the "hot pursuit" exception. The latter, as opposed to the for-
mer, invariably involves "some element of [police] chase" of an
arrestee who is attempting to elude the police by entering an
otherwise constitutionally protected area, such as a home.
This article proposes that when police act in response to an
emergency, this action is within their community caretaking
function, and is not a variant of exigent circumstances, but, like
a border search or hot pursuit, is a separate exception to the
Fourth Amendment.
II. THE DUAL ROLES OF AMERICAN LAw ENFORCEMENT
A. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
COMMUNITY CARETAXING FUNCTIONS.
Law enforcement officers generally act pursuant to either
law enforcement or community caretaking objectives. The dif-
ference between the two stems from the officers' underlying
motives. The law enforcement function includes conduct that is
designed to detect or solve a specific crime, such as making ar-
rests, interrogating suspects, and searching for evidence.
Community caretaking, on the other hand, is based on a service
notion that police serve to ensure the safety and welfare of the
citizenry at large.57 For example, this may involve approaching a
Id. at 618.
"427 U.S. 38 (1976).
"Id. at 43 n.3.
7 The Virginia Court of Appeals has offered an analytical framework for assessing
whether police conduct fits the mold of community caretaking:
"The appropriateness of applying the community caretaking doctrine to a given fac-
tual scenario is determined by whether- (1) the officer's initial contact or investigation is
reasonable; (2) the intrusion is limited; and (3) the officer is not investigating criminal
conduct under the pretext of exercising his community caretaking fumction." Police offi-
cers have an obligation to aid citizens who are ill or in distress, as well as a duty to protect
the citizens from criminal activity.
The two functions are unrelated but not exclusive to one another. "Objective rea-




seemingly stranded motorist or lost child to inquire whether he
or she needs assistance, assisting persons involved in a natural
disaster, or warning members of a community about a hazard-
ous materials leak in the area.
In People-v. Murray8 the Illinois Supreme Court noted three
tiers of police-citizen encounters, two of which are in the nature
of law enforcement and one of which is in the nature of com-
munity caretaking.0 On the law enforcement side, the court in-
cluded the traditional arrest, which must be supported by
probable cause ° and the so-called "Terry stop," a brief seizure
that must be supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal ac-
tivity61 On the community caretaking side, the court included
actions where "local police officers... frequently investigate ve-
hicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability"
and engage in functions "total divorced" from possible criminal-
ity.6
2
When an officer is pursuing a community caretaking func-
tion that in no way involves a "seizure" of a person, no "particu-
larized and objective justification" for his actions is required.0
In other words, the traditional constitutional requirements in-
volving a warrant, probable cause, and the like have no operable
effect in this form of police-citizen encounter.6 Thus, in
Murray, where police approached a defendant who was sleeping
in his vehicle parked on the side of the road, woke the defen-
dant by tapping on the window and asked him to exit the vehi-
cle to determine if defendant was in distress, the court
concluded this police activity was justified by the officer's com-
munity caretaking function, inasmuch as the defendant, at the
Wood v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d 627, 630 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Common-
wealth v. Waters, 4567 S.E.2d 527, 530 (Va. 1995)).
560 N.E.2d 309 (Ill. 1990).
I& at 311 (citing United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 591 (5th Cir. 1982)).
6 Id (citing Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959)).
Id-:L (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
"I& at 312 (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)).
"I& (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544-45 (1980)) ("[Als long as
the person... remains free ... to walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that
person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution require some particular-
ized and objective justification.").
"South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,370 n. 5 (1976).
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point of his exit, was free to decline the officer's request.6
Here, a gun observed on the floor of defendant's vehicle was not
discovered during the course of a "seizure" of defendant's per-
son.6 Rather, the police had noticed the gun in plain view
while exercising their "community caretaking" obligations.6 7
While community caretaking seems virtually limitless in ap-
plication,s at least two specific applications of this concept have
strong support in the caselaw; namely, police actions that are
"Murray, 560 N.E.2d at 314.
6Id.
68 See, e.g. United States v. York, 895 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1990) (community caretak-
ing concept legitimized police accompanying invitee into defendant's home while in-
vitee attempted to peacefully remove his family and personal belongings following
defendant's earlier threats, while intoxicated, directed at invitee's family; deputy sher-
iff's observations of illegal firearms in plain view upheld); People v. Crocker, 641
N.E.2d. 1237 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (conduct of officer in exiting his car, approaching
defendant walking away from vehicle and asking him if he needed a ride, whereupon
officer observed evidence of defendant's driving while intoxicated, was within offi-
cer's "community caretaking functions" and not a search or seizure governed by the
Fourth Amendment); People v. Todd, 619 N.E.2d. 1353 (Il. App. Ct. 1993) (conduct
of officer in approaching defendant sitting in parked car in public parking lot with
eyes closed, and officer unable to tell if defendant was sleeping, unconscious, or
dead, whereupon officer observed evidence of residential burglary on floorboard of
car, was within officer's "community caretaking" function); People v. Carlile, 600
N.E.2d 916 (Il. App. Ct. 1992) (conduct of officer in entering defendant's house at
defendant's request to attempt to get defendant's former girlfriend to peacefully
leave defendant's house, whereupon officer encountered evidence of defendant's il-
licit drug activity, was within officer's "community caretaking functions"); People v.
Quigley, 589 N.E.2d 133 (111. App. Ct. 1992) (conduct of officer in stopping motorist
to inquire as to cause of heated argument between motorist and another driver at
stop sign, whereupon officer observed evidence of defendant's driving while intoxi-
cated, was within officer's "community caretaking functions"); State v. Washington,
687 A.2d 343 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (community caretaking doctrine permit-
ted police stop of vehicle that was weaving and driving under speed limit since it
posed a potential safety hazard to other vehicles; subsequent discovery of evidence of
driving while intoxicated upheld); Wood v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d. 627 (Va. Ct.
App. 1997) (community caretaking doctrine authorized police officers who had just
arrested defendant for beating his wife to conduct a warrantless search of defendant's
home for a teenage stepchild that the defendant had recently reported missing, resul-
tant discovery of illegal drugs and firearms in plain view upheld); Commonwealth v.
Waters, 456 S.E.2d 527 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (police officer's initial stop of defendant
was reasonable exercise of officer's community caretaking function where officer ob-
served defendant swaying and walking unsteadily, which officer interpreted to be a
result of intoxication, illness or person otherwise in need of help; officer's subsequent




being carried out in the furtherance of a property "inventory"6
and those which are addressing an emergency.70 The situation
where the United States Supreme Court first described the
community caretaking function was in connection with police
inventories of private property and, accordingly, exploration of
this concept will begin with a review of this caselaw.
B. APPLICATIONS OF THE COMMUNITY CARETAKING CONCEPT
1. Inventory
In Cady v. Dombrowski 1 decided by the United States Su-
preme Court in 1973, a defendant's automobile was disabled as
a result of an accident along a highway. Since the vehicle con-
stituted a nuisance and the defendant, being intoxicated and
later comatose, could not make arrangements to have the vehi-
cle removed, the police had the vehicle towed to a private ga-72
rage. Inasmuch as the police realized the defendant was a
Chicago police officer, thought that Chicago police officers
were required to carry their service revolvers at all times, and
did not find a gun on defendant's person, a police officer took
action designed to retrieve the gun from the defendant's auto-
mobile because of his "concern for the safety of the general
public who might be endangered if an intruder removed a re-
volver from the trunk of the vehicle."7 During this police ac-
tion, which was described as "standard procedure" in the
department, the officer discovered evidence of defendant's in-
volvement in a murder that had occurred in the area.74 Here,
the Court noted the officer's discovery of the evidence occurred
during a "caretaking" effort, a conclusion that was reinforced by
the fact that the officer was ignorant of the occurrence of the
9 See infra Part II.B.1 for a discussion of United States Supreme Court decisions in-
volving the "inventory" doctrine.
70 See infra Part ll.B.2 for a discussion of United States Supreme Court decisions
that have discussed an emergency.
71 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
72 Id at 435-36.
Id,. at 447.
7 4 Id- at 437.
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murder at the time of his discovery of the evidence.7 Since the
officer reasonably believed the automobile contained a gun that
was "vulnerable to intrusion by vandals," this search was reason-
able under the Fourth Amendment.76
In 1976, the Court, in South Dakota v. Oppernan,7 held a rou-
tine inventory of a defendant's locked automobile, which had
been lawfully impounded for multiple violations of municipal
parking ordinances, was reasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment.7 The Court noted three important policy interests justi-
fied routine inventories of impounded 'vehicles: (1)
safeguarding an owner's property, (2) shielding authorities
from accusations of theft, and (3) protecting against dangerous
instrumentalities that might be in the vehicle." In addition,
there was "no suggestion whatever that this standard procedure,
essentially like that followed throughout the country, was a pre-
text concealing an investigatory police motive."0 Here, then,
the inadvertent discovery of marijuana during the inventory did
not violate the Fourth Amendment." The fact that the police
did not have probable cause or a warrant was irrelevant given
the "noncriminal context of inventory searches." 2
In 1987, in Colorado v. Bertine,83 police arrested defendant for
driving his van under the influence of alcohol, inventoried the
vehicle and various containers therein and found evidence of il-
licit drug activity within the containers.8 Since there was "no
showing that the police, who were following standardized pro-
cedures, acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investiga-
tion" of possible criminality, the police action was deemed
reasonable.8 The fact that the police did not pursue "less intru-
Id. at 447-48.
76 Id. at 448.
428 U.S. 364 (1976).
73 Id. at 376.
79Id. at 369.
"0 Id at 376.
s'Id-
2 Id at 370 n.5.





sive" means, such as providing defendant with the opportunity
to- make other arrangements for the safekeeping of his property,
did not undermine the validity of the inventory.& Bertine is in-
structive for two reasons. First, an inventory of a closed con-
tainer is permissible in this context. In other situations, the
court has described a dosed container as a "repository of per-
sonal effects," which police may not normally search without a
warrant. The second, and more important, reason that Bertine
is instructive is because it illustrates the community caretaking
concept generally. This concept is revealed in the "sole pur-
pose" language quoted above which clearly implies that police
might simultaneously pursue both a law enforcement goal and a
community caretaking objective. In other words, only where the
police purpose or motive is a singular law enforcement one, do
the usual Fourth Amendment commands regarding warrants
and probable cause apply.
In Flofida v. Wells,ts the United States Supreme Court held
that "standardized criteria" or "established routine" must govern
opening closed containers during the course of an automobile
inventory.ts Here, the unfettered discretion of the officer in re-
gards to carrying out an inventory carried the potential of being
turned into "a ruse for a general rummaging in order to dis-
cover incriminating evidence" of a crime, and, thus, was uncon-
stitutional.90
Finally, in Illinois v. LaFayette,9' the Supreme Court ruled an
inventory of an arrestee's personal effects during the course of a
police "booking" was permissible under the Fourth Amend-
ment.9' Although the Court did not refer to the "community
caretaking" concept directly, they adopted the policy concerns
6Id. at 373-74.
' SeeArkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 766 (1979) and United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977), holding that searches of closed trunks and suitcases for evi-
dence of criminality must be carried out pursuant to a search warrant based on prob-
able cause since these items are normally repositories of personal effects.
8 495 U.S. 1 (1990).
'9 Id at 3-4.
0Id. at 4.
91462 U.S. 640 (1983).
9 Id. at 645.
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enunciated in Opperan-safekeeping an owner's property,
avoiding police liability, and protecting against dangerous in-
strumentalities-as justifications for the police activity at issue.93
Thus, the discovery of a controlled substance in the defendant's
shoulder bag during the booking inventory was ruled constitu-
tional. As with those inventory decisions where the Court ex-
plicitly validates challenged police activity on a caretaking
rationale, it is the supposed benevolence of the police, at least
in part, that caused the court to give its blessing to a police in-
ventory in the booking context as well.
2. Emergency
Although the United States Supreme Court has never ex-
pressly stated that a police officer's "community caretaking"
functions include addressing "emergency" situations, it has
commented in several cases-albeit most often in dicta-that
police responsibilities include addressing circumstances beyond
criminal investigation and detection where personal safety or a
substantial property interest might by threatened by imminent
danger. For example, in Camara v. Municipal Court of San Fran-
cisco,6 the Court held that an administrative inspection of a pri-
vate dwelling, in circumstances where a municipal inspector had
time to procure a search warrant, violated the Fourth Amend-
ment.96 The Court, however, added "nothing we say today is in-
tended to foreclose prompt inspections, even without a warrant,
that the law has traditionally upheld in emergency situations."97
In Camara, the Court's examples of possible emergencies requir-
ing immediate government response included exposure of the
public to unwholesome food, smallpox,'and tubercular cattle.9
9Id. at 646-47.
" Id. at 643.
9s387 U.S. 523 (1967).
"Id at 540.
Id. at 539 (citing North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S.
306 (1908) (seizure of unwholesome food); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905) (compulsory smallpox vaccination); Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a
Vapeur v. Board of Health of Louisiana, 186 U.S. 380 (1902) (health quarantine);
Kroplin v. Truax, 165 N.E. 498 (Ohio 1929) (summary destruction of tubercular cat-
tie)).
"Camara, 387 U.S. at 539.
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In a fashion, Cady v. Dombrowski,°9 discussed above, might
alsd be viewed as a decision where the Court approved a police
officer's action because of his concern for the general safety of
the public.10 In Cady, the Court found it factually significant
that the police officer's attempt to retrieve a gun from defen-
dant's disabled automobile was motivated by his intent "to pro-
tect the public from the possibility that a revolver would fall into
untrained or perhaps malicious hands."0 1
In Michigan v. Tyler,102 the Court approved the action of fire-
fighters who entered a furniture store to put out a fire, and then
discovered evidence of arson for insurance fraud purposes
within the premises. The Court stated, "[a] burning building
clearly presents an exigency of sufficient proportion to render a
warrantless entry 'reasonable.' ... Indeed, it would defy reason
to suppose that firemen must secure a warrant or consent be-
fore entering a burning structure to put out the blaze." 03 Later,
in Michigan v. Clifford,°'4 another arson-for-fraud case, the Court
essentially repeated itself when it said, "[a] burning building of
course creates an exigency."105
Finally, in Mincey v. Arizona,1°6 the Court held that Arizona's
"murder scene exception" to the Fourth Amendment warrant
clause was unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that a homi-
cide scene does not automatically create some type of exigency
per se permitting an immediate police entry into private prem-
ises.'l Nevertheless, Mincey offers additional dictum in support
of an emergency doctrine in appropriate circumstances. The
Court stated, "[w] e do not question the right of the police to re-
spond to emergency situations. Numerous state and federal
413 U.S. 433 (1973).
'® Id. at 447.
1o1 Id. at 443.
"2 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
'' Id. at 509.
464 U.S. 287 (1984).
,'Id. at 293. In Clfford, the court held a search for evidence of arson that was de-
layed until several hours after the fire was extinguished was beyond the scope of the
earlier emergency. I& at 298.
'06 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
"7 Id. at 393.
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cases recognize the Fourth Amendment does not bar police of-
ficers from making warrantless entries and searches when they
reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate
aid."
10 8
C. ANALYTICAL PROBLEMS IN MUDDLING THE LAW ENFORCEMENT-
COMMUNITY CARETAKING DICHOTOMY.
It is not uncommon to encounter decisions that do not re-
flect a sharp differentiation between the community caretaking
and law enforcement roles of the police. The result of the fail-
ure to address this dichotomy often leads to two related analyti-
cal problems. First, in some instances, it is unclear whether a
court opinion is determining the propriety of challenged police
action on law enforcement grounds-which necessarily leads to
questions about whether the police were involved in a "search,"
had a reasonable suspicion or probable cause, needed a war-
rant, or were faced with exigent circumstances-or on the basis
of community caretaking functions, which addresses the differ-
ent question of whether there were significant threats to per-
sons or property interests that required immediate protective
police action. For example, in United States v. Rohrig,09 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit analyzed
facts arising out of a report of loud music emanating from de-
fendant's home in the middle of the night that was disturbing
neighbors, a warrantless police entry to address the problem
and a subsequent discovery of marijuana plants in plain view. At
the outset of the court's analysis of the Fourth Amendment, the
court thoroughly addressed the importance of the warrant re-
quirement,"' discussed at length the "exigent circumstances"
justification for warrantless entries,"' and carefully explained
how the United States Supreme Court in Welsh v. Wisconsin 112
had ruled that the "exigent circumstances" exception to the
warrant requirement could not be invoked by police attempting
"' Id. at 392.
0 98 F.3d 1506 (6th Cir. 1996).
1 Id. at 1511-15.
.. Id. at 1515-18.
"' 466 U.S. 740, 753-54 (1984).
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to arrest a person in his residence for a minor offense ." In ad-
dressing the propriety of police effort to arrest the defendant
for a municipal noise ordinance violation punishable by a
maximum fine of $100 (a transgression even less serious than
driving under the influence of an intoxicant charge that was at
issue in Welsh), the opinion slides into a discussion of how this
"warrantless entry to abate an ongoing nuisance" was designed
to "protect the well-being of the immediate community."
Opining that the "Welsh analysis has less relevance as one moves
away from traditional law-enforcement functions and toward...
'community caretaking functions,'""5 that the warrant clause is
"implicated to a lesser degree when police act in their roles as
'community caretakers,'"" 6 and that it is not "tenable" to insist
the community caretaker have probable cause before undertak-
ing his or her duties,"17 the Sixth Circuit in its closing paragraph
stated "we conclude that the ... warrantless entry into Defen-
dant's home was justified by exigent circumstances, and that the of-
ficers' subsequent discovery of marijuana plants... wasjustified
under the 'plain view' doctrine. Here, then, this court: (1)
implied that warrants may be necessary in some circumstances
in the community caretaking context and (2) evidently views
community caretaking functions, at least in some cases, as a
form of exigent circumstances. It should be noted, however,
that the first proposition has no support in any of the United
States Supreme Court decisions involving community caretak-
ing. The second creates a subcategory of exigent circumstances
that allows a warrantless entry into a dwelling where the police
motive is to address a trivial offense, clearly a proposition that is
contrary to Welsh v. Wisconsin.
"3 Rohrig, 98 F.3d at 1516.
"
4 Id. at 1520.
"Id. at 1521.
" Id. at 1523 (emphasis added).
17Id.
"8Id. at 1526 (emphasis added). A seizure of evidence that is in plain view is justi-
fied if an official observed the evidence from a place where he or she had a right to
be, and the incriminating character of the evidence is immediately aparent and




A second problem that appears in opinions which muddle
law enforcement and community caretaking functions is that it
leads courts to unnecessarily look for probable cause, warrants,
or exigent circumstances where a straightforward community
caretaking analysis would avoid such hurdles. In United States v.
Johnson,"9 another opinion by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit, the court justified the actions of offi-
cers who entered a residence after receiving a dispatch
indicating a burglary in progress using the rubric of probable
cause and exigent circumstances.'2 Police were dispatched to
the defendant's residence when a neighbor called to report a
burglary in progress. The neighbor reported observing people
crawl through a window of the defendant's home. 2 ' When the
police arrived, they found the door locked and a window pane
broken in the kitchen.'2 No one answered the officers' knocks,
but as the police neared the window, they noticed two individu-
als inside.'2 One woman claimed she lived there, however she
had no key, and she could not produce any identification.
2 4
The police ordered the two individuals to exit the house
through the window, and then secured them in the squad car.'2
As the police approached the house a second time, they en-
countered two more individuals.'2 After all four individuals
were placed in the squad car, the police entered the house to
determine if anyone else was inside.'2 Once inside, the police
saw various items, including gun clips and ammunition, a dy-
namite fuse, and bomb-making materials.'2 When the defen-
dant came home, he refused to consent to a search, whereupon
the police obtained a warrant and conducted a more thorough
search of the premises. The defendant was ultimately convicted
" 9 F.3d 506 (6th Cir. 1995).
'20 Id. at 509-10.












of two offenses as a result of an illegal firearm found during the
search.'2
The Sixth Circuit, which used the terms "emergency" and
"exigent" circumstances interchangeably throughout its analysis,
upheld the officers' entry. The court held that, based on the
neighbor's report, the broken window, and the presence of in-
dividuals inside the residence who were acting suspiciously and
who failed to supply identification, the officers had probable
cause to believe that criminal activity was afoot inside the resi-
dence.18 ° Further, the court stated that the officers' decision to
enter the premises to secure the owner's property and conduct
a protective sweep, without first obtaining a warrant, was rea-
sonable since an emergency situation existed.'8 '
The Sixth Circuit's analysis is somewhat confusing. As noted
above, in Johnson, the court approved of the officers' entry be-
cause it found that probable cause existed along with emer-
gency and/or exigent circumstances. These are, however, two
separate arguments for justifying a warrantless search. As was
discussed above, 2 the probable cause and exigent circumstance
analysis, as ordinarily applied, focuses exclusively on the offi-
cers' law enforcement objective. Thus, relying on a law en-
forcement analysis compels the court in a case like Johnson to
find that the officer had probable cause to believe that a bur-
glary was in progress, and that the warrantless entry was justified
to prevent the suspected criminals from escaping. On the other
hand, the emergency exception is based on the officers' com-
munity caretaking functions that, for the moment, may have su-
perseded their law enforcement objectives. Not merely
concerned with gathering evidence of a crime, the officer was,
in addition, focused on aiding possible crime victims or prevent-
ing damage to property, which thereby avoids the necessity of
' Id. at 508.
' Id. at 509. The Sixth Circuit, like most courts, recognizes the emergency excep-
tion as falling under the exigent circumstances doctrine. It defines an emergency as
any situation where the need for urgent police action excuses the failure to procure a
warrant. Further, this court also requires a finding of probable cause, which means a
substantial chance that criminal activity exists, before the officers can enter. Id
... Id. at 510.
' See supra Part I.C.
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needing probable cause to arrest or search, or obtaining search
or arrest warrants.'3 Therefore, community caretaking analysis
offers a more appropriate doctrinal framework to use when con-
fronted with such a situation.13 In other words, the emergency
exception provides a more convenient second avenue, separate
from exigent circumstances, for justifying a warrantless entry in
a case such as Johnson, although both theories, law enforcement
and community caretaking, may lead to a similar result.
Ill. THE EMERGENCYDOCTRINE
A. PRONG ONE: THERE MUST EXIST AN OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE
BASIS FOR A BELIEF IN AN INMEDIATE NEED FOR POLICE
ASSISTANCE FOR THE PROTECTION OF LIFE OR SUBSTANTIAL
PROPERTY INTERESTS.
The first condition that must appear before police can take
action under the authority of the emergency doctrine is the
presence of a true emergency situation. For the purposes of this
article, I define an emergency as a situation where a police offi-
cer has an objectively reasonable basis for a belief that there is
an immediate need for police assistance for the protection of
human life or property. s No actual emergency need be pres-
ent in order to satisfy the doctrine.
1. Objectively Reasonable Standard
The determination of whether an emergency situation exists
should be made consistent with an objective standard. The
court must determine if, under the known circumstances at the
IS' As one examines the arguments made and the facts presented to a court in a
burglary-in-progress case, it seems that the police are generally focused on stopping a
crime in progress, and capturing the burglar, more so than providing immediate re-
lief to a person or property interests. However, where the police respond to a re-
ported burglary in progress and hear screams as they approach a residence, the claim
of an emergency may provide a more logical argument than focusing on detection of
criminality. See infra Part III.B for a discussion of the importance of the officer's mo-
tive.
" See supra Part IIA for a discussion of the community caretaking doctrine.
'm Cf United States v. Bute, 43 F.3d 531, 540 (10th Cir. 1994) ("[A] warrantless en-
try only is permitted under the Fourth Amendment when the officer has an objec-
tively reasonable belief that an emergency exists requiring immediate entry to render
assistance or prevent harm to persons or property within.").
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time, the acting police officer could have reasonably believed that
there was an immediate need for his or her community caretak-
ing assistance. This determination is often fact-specific, and var-
ies greatly depending upon the circumstances of the case and
the deciding court. Courts recognize that police faced with a
possible emergency are often required to make split second de-
cisions and, consequently, tend to be deferential toward police
conclusions that their actions were necessary. s6 While some
courts have held that certain situations are per se emergencies,
3 7
normally, it is necessary to consider the totality of circumstances
to determine if the officer's belief that an emergency existed
was objectively reasonable1ss In addition, at least one court has
developed a checklist of factors considered useful in determin-
ing whether there was an objectively reasonable basis for an of-
ficer's belief. These factors include "[ t ]he nature and specificity
of the call, the speed with which the officers responded
(thereby increasing the chances that the danger still existed)
'm In a case involving police response to a report of an unconscious woman, who in
fact had died as a result of an illegal abortion, CircuitJudge (later ChiefJustice) Bur-
ger observed:
Fires or dead bodies are reported to police by cranks where no fires or bodies are to be
found. Acting in response to reports of "dead bodies," the police may find the "bodies"
to be common drunks, diabetics in shock, or distressed cardiac patients. But the busi-
ness of policemen and firemen is to act not to speculate or meditate on whether the re-
port is correct. People could well die in emergencies if police tried to act with the calm
deliberation associated with the judicial process. Even the apparently dead often are
saved by swift police response. A myriad of circumstances could fall within the terms
"exigent circumstances" .... e.g., smoke coming out a window or under a door, the
sound of gunfire in the house, threats from inside to shoot through the door at police,
reasonable grounds to believe an injured or seriously ill person is being held within.
Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (plurality opin-
ion) (emphasis in the original).
In addition, some courts emphasize that responding police need not use the least
intrusive alternative approach to addressing an emergency. "In recognizing the dan-
ger of delayed response, the law does not require adherence to a standard which
'made stricter by hindsight' would preclude the police from all courses of conduct
but the least instrusive." People v. DePaula, 579 N.Y.S.2d 10, 12 (N.Y. App. Div.
1992) (quoting People v. Calhoun, 402 N.E.2d 1145, 1148 (N.Y. 1980)).
" See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) ("A burning building clearly




and ... [the] reception [of the police] by the defendant."' 9
While each situation an officer encounters is factually unique,
certain patterns have emerged in the judicial response to gov-
ernment claims that an emergency did exist. This article will
now focus on various categories of events which reviewing courts
have agreed generally provide a government agent with a rea-
sonable belief in the existence of an emergency.
2. Situations in which the Emergency Doctrine has been Recognized
a) Person in need of medical treatment
One category of cases in which many courts have found the
emergency doctrine to apply is in response to a report of a per-
son in immediate need of medical treatment.'4 These cases of-
ten involve officers responding to reports of a drug overdose
and the subsequent discovery of evidence of drug-related crimes
in plain view.14' Although these police responses are often con-
tested, courts consistently deny defendants' motions to suppress
this type of evidence when the officers are in a location or tak-
ing action designed to render aid to an unconscious or possibly
injured person.4  However, use of the emergency doctrine is
,$ DePaula, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 11-12.
140 See, e.g., City of Troy v. Ohlinger, 475 N.W.2d 54 (Mich. 1991) (where witness of
automobile accident reported to police officer that defendant drove away from acci-
dent scene holding his hand as if injured and police officer discovered defendant's
damaged car in his driveway, police officer was justified as part of community caretak-
ing function in shining flashlight into defendant's house and, upon seeing defendant
bleeding and not moving, entering defendant's home to determine if medical assis-
tance was required; officer's subsequent discovery of evidence of defendant's driving
while intoxicated upheld).
141 See, e.g., LaFournier v. State, 280 N.W.2d 746 (Wis. 1979) (report of a drug over-
dose gave police officer justification to locate and aid victim in a residence without a
warrant; police officer, once on premises, could seize evidence in plain view, however,
since officer who came to victim's aid could not preserve the evidence he observed in
plain view, an immediate entry by other officers without a warrant, restricted in na-
ture and scope to securing the evidence observed by first officer in plain view, was
lawful).
10 See, e.g., State v. Follett, 840 P.2d 1298 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (where search of de-
fendant's automobile for substance which might explain defendant's serious medical
condition and symptoms consistent with intoxication caused by substance other than
alcohol, search permissible under "emergency-aid doctrine"; convictions for driving
while intoxicated and possession of controlled substances upheld).
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not warranted merely by a report of a person under the influ-
ence of drugs or alcohol.' Courts have held that there must
also be evidence that the impaired individual is in need of some
sort of immediate medical treatment.1"
In Terry v. Commonwealth,'4 decided by the Virginia Court of
Appeals, a police officer arrived at a park in response to a medi-
cal emergency call where he found defendant in a semi-
unconscious state.'4 While searching defendant's fanny pack to
establish identification, locate medical information and to de-
termine the cause of defendant's condition, the officer discov-
ered marijuana.1 47 The court upheld defendant's conviction for
possession of marijuana after determining the officer's conduct
fell within the parameters of legitimate community caretaking
because: (1) the officer's initial investigation was reasonable; (2)
the intrusion was limited; and (3) the officer was not investigat-
ing criminal conduct under the pretext of exercising his com-
munity caretaking function.1'
In LaFournier v. State,149 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
held a police officer's warrantless entry into a home was permis-
sible under the emergency exception where a police officer re-
sponded to a report of a drug overdose. 50 The officer entered
the house indicated in the report and discovered a seriously ill
woman in the basement and drug paraphernalia on the base-
ment floor in plain view.5 The officer called for police backup
to collect the paraphernalia while he accompanied the woman
to the hospital 52 The backup officers arrived and found the de-
fendant sitting in the basement.5 The defendant admitted that
" See, e.g., Bray v. State, 597 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Grim. App. 1980).
144 See, e.g., id. at 768.
' 474 S.E.2d 172 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
146 I&
" M at 172-73.
14 1& at 174.







he was under the influence of narcotics.'- The officers found
more drug paraphernalia near the defendant in plain view. 5
The officers subsequently arrested the defendant and discov-
ered three bags of heroin on defendant's person during a
search incident to the arrest.
56
The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's re-
fusal to suppress the evidence and found the defendant guilty of
15criminal possession of narcotics.5 The court held that a war-
rantless entry into a dwelling in response to a reported drug
overdose is reasonable under the emergency doctrine. The ini-
tial responding officer was justified in entering the home with-
out a warrant in order to aid the overdose victim.1 5  The court
further found that the backup officers were merely acting as a
continuation of the initial officer's authority.5 9
Similarly, in People v. Amato,'6° the Supreme Court of Colo-
rado upheld a warrantless entry and seizure where government
agents responded to an emergency call for medical assistance. 6'
Here, the police and the resuscitation unit of a fire department
were dispatched to the defendant's residence on the basis of an
emergency 911 call.'62 It was reported that the defendant had
fallen in the bathroom and was not responding to his room-
mate's attempts to revive him.10 A firefighter entered the bath-
room to aid the defendant, and observed drugs and
paraphernalia on top of the toilet tank.'6 The firefighter
showed the items to a police officer, who promptly seized
them.16 The defendant was placed under arrest for criminal




7 Id. at 751.
's, Id. at 749-50.
"'Id. at 750-51.
'60 562 P.2d 422 (Colo. 1977).







possession of illicit drugs and then transported to a hospital for
treatment.1'
The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the officers' entry
into the dwelling and seizure of the items in plain view as valid
under the emergency doctrine. 67 The Court concluded that the
firefighters and the police officers acted reasonably given the
emergency circumstances they encountered.16
The Oregon Court of Appeals used similar reasoning in
State v. Russell.U ' In that case, a police officer and paramedics
responded to a woman's report that she was unable to awaken
her adult daughter, the defendant's sister.17 The daughter was
in her own home on the couch and appeared unconscious to
the officer, who was looking through a window. 7' The daugh-
ter's three young children were also locked in the house by a
door, locked with a dead bolt, that could only be opened from
the inside with a key.17 The responding officer, while standing
outside, tried to wake the daughter by making noise. When this
was unsuccessful, he entered the house through a basement
window.173 Inside, he observed marijuana plants growing in
plain view, which were later found-to belong to the defendant,
the daughter's brother.7 4
The Oregon Court of Appeals affirned the defendant's
conviction for the manufacture and delivery of marijuana. 75 Al-
though the paramedics eventually determined the defendant's
sister was not in medical distress, the court nonetheless found
that the circumstances of the case met the requirements of the





"a Id. at 424.
'6 848 P.2d 657 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (en banc).







'76 Id. at 659.
[Vol. 89
199]EERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES
it was necessary to enter the house to aid the defendant's sister
and her children.1"
While these cases seemingly lead to the conclusion that a
possible overdose always gives police the authority to enter a
dwelling without a warrant, this is not necessarily true. For ex-
ample, in Bray v. State,17 a police officer received a dispatch to
accompany an ambulance to the scene of a possible drug over-
dose.'7 When the officer arrived at the scene, the ambulance
attendants had already investigated the situation and were pre-
paring to leave.'O The attendants told the officer that the de-
fendant was under the influence of narcotics, but that he was
conscious and not in need of any immediate assistance. 8' In
addition, the officer learned that there were other people in the
apartment who could seek aid for the defendant, if his condi-
tion should deteriorate. Despite the ambulance attendants'
assurances that there was no emergency at hand, the officer en-
tered the apartment to investigate.188 The officer stated that the
ambulance attendants had told him that the defendant had re-
cently injected a drug that they had not identified. Conse-
quently, they were unclear whether it had taken effect. Thus,
the officer believed it was his obligation to determine the cause
of the overdose and investigate the defendant's condition. 4
The officer found the defendant holding drugs and parapher-
nalia in the bathroom of the apartment.'8 The defendant was
convicted of heroin possession and, as a repeat felony offender,
he was sentenced to life imprisonment.'8
The appellate court reversed the defendant's conviction on




' 597 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1980).





'8 Id. at 766.
"'Id. at 767.
'"Id. at 763.
'17 Id. at 769.
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court found that the officer was not reasonable in believing that
an emergency existed that would justify his warrantless entry
into the apartment. ' s The court noted that while some over-
dose reports will warrant use of the emergency exception, in
this case, the facts strongly indicated that there was no objective
basis for finding that an emergency existed." The trained
members of the ambulance crew had already concluded that
there was no emergency and had related this information to the
officer.'" Furthermore, as the defendant was no longer uncon-
scious when the officer arrived, the officer was not acting to aid
a possible overdose when he entered the apartment.' 9' The
court noted there is a difference between rendering emergency
aid and investigating the possible criminal cause of an emer-
gency.192 This case illustrates how a reviewing court may reject
an officer's claim that he was addressing an emergency when
the facts suggest instead that he was pursuing law enforcement
functions.
In assessing a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel in a case where the defendant's lawyer ne-
glected to file a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a
warrantless entry, which police claimed was justified by an
emergency, one appellate court held that the defendant's rights
to a fair trial had been violated because of the lawyer's ommis-
sion. In Commonwealth v. DiGeronimo, 9 3 the court held that an of-
ficer's entry into an intoxicated defendant's apartment was not
a valid use of the emergency doctrine when the defendant was
not in need of medical attention.' In this case, on his way
home from a tavern, the defendant was involved in an automo-







,9' 652 N.E.2d 148, 159 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995).
4 Id. at 155. See also Morris v. State, 908 P.2d 931, 937 (Wyo. 1995) (deputy sheriff
overstepped his community caretaking function by searching wallet of somewhat dis-
oriented defendant found sleeping in someone else's backyard since defendant suffi-
ciently alert "to answer questions and keep his faculties about him").
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another vehicle.' 95 Neither party was injured, but the other
driver's car was inoperable.19 The other driver noticed that the
defendant appeared to be intoxicated-his speech was slurred
and he used obscenitites.'9 7 The defendant left the scene and
drove to his apartment where he called the police and reported
the accident.198 The defendant then turned on his television
and fell asleep in a chair." An officer was sent to the scene of
the accident to investigate.2 ° He spoke with the driver of the
other vehicle who told the officer he believed that the defen-
dant was drunk.20 The officer then went to the defendant's
apartment.f° He knocked on the door, but received no an-
swer.23 However, the officer could hear the sound of the de-
fendant's television inside.2 Thereafter, the officer entered the
defendant's apartment using a security guard's passkey and ar-
rested the defendant25 The trial court found the defendant
guilty of the misdemeanor of operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence.2
The appeals court reversed, and held that, in spite of the of-
ficer's claim that he entered the apartment under the subjective
belief that the defendant was in need of aid, the entry was un-
justified °7 The court found there was no objective basis for be-
lieving that the defendant was in need of medical aid.20 The
court noted that the other driver told the officer that the de-
fendant was drunk, not injured.2 09 Furthermore, the defendant
was able to drive himself home from the accident and had


















called the police to report the incident, without indicating that
he was in need of aid.1 ° In addition, there were no "alarming
signs" outside of the defendant's apartment, such as blood or
the sound of screams or moans, that would support an objective
belief that the defendant was in need of emergency assistance. 1
Also, the officer was at the scene of the accident for nearly an
hour before he proceeded to the defendant's residence, thereby
implying that he did not view the situation as an emergency. 2
As a result, the court decided that the defendant's rights had
been violated by his attorney's failure to challenge the unconsti-
tutional police entry, and granted a new trial.
b) Missing Persons
Not only do the courts often uphold warrantless police en-
tries as valid when a person is thought to be in need of aid, but
the courts have routinely upheld the use of the emergency doc-
trine in response to a report of a missing person as well.
Courts have upheld searches for a missing person at his or her
residence,15 at the last place the missing person was seen,2 6 and
at places where evidence that would reveal the location of the
missing person might be found.1 7 While some courts have ac-
cepted the report of a missing person alone to be sufficient in
establishing an emergency,218 more often, courts also look to the
circumstances surrounding the report to see if the belief that an




2" Id. at 159.
2" See, e.g., Brimage v. State, 918 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc)
(entry of residence to find missing person or evidence of missing person's where-
abouts upheld); People v. Wharton, 809 P.2d 290 (Cal. 1991) (entry of residence to
locate missing individual upheld); Chaney v. State, 612 P.2d 269 (Okla. Crim. App.
1980) (entry of premises to discover evidence that might reveal missing person's
whereabouts upheld).
2- People v. Bondi, 474 N.E.2d 733, 736 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
2,1 People v. Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d 607, 610 (N.Y. 1976).
7 Chaney v. State, 612 P.2d 269, 277 (Okla. Grim. App. 1980).
2"' See, e.g., People v. Bondi, 474 N.E.2d 733, 735 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
"' See, e.g., State v. Epperson, 571 S.W.2d 260 (Mo. 1978).
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For example, in Oken v. State, the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals upheld a police entry into a home based on the emer-
gency doctrine in circumstances involving a missing person.2" A
missing woman's sister called the police to a townhouse.2 1 The
sister told the officers that she was afraid her sister had been
harmed.2 She pointed out to the police that the door of the
townhouse was partially open, the house was in disarray, and
there was blood on the floor near the entrance.20 One police
officer entered the house and found evidence, including blood
and women's clothing, in plain view.22 4 When no one was found
inside, the police secured the premises, obtained a warrant to
further search the house, and found a weapon during the later
search that had been used by the defendant in an earlier mur-
der of another woman.2 The defendant moved to suppress the
weapon found in his townhouse on the theory that the initial
warrantless entry into the townhouse was illegal and the later
search was a "fruit of the poisonous tree."m The trial and appel-
late courts held that the officer's initial entry into the home
based on the totality of the circumstances was an appropriate
use of the emergency doctrine. Consequently, the evidence
found in the defendant's townhouse implicating the defendant
in the earlier murder was properly used in the defendant's con-
viction for the earlier murder2 8
In a similar case decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri,
State v. Epperson, police officers responded to a mother's report
of her missing adult daughter and grandchildren. m The
mother had tried unsuccessfully to reach her daughter by tele-
phone for several days and when she questioned the daughter's
- 612 A.2d 258, 267 (Md. 1992).






2 Id. at 266. The missing woman's (defendant's wife) body was later discovered by
police. Id.
2m id.
n7 Id. at 267.
nm Id.
2 571 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Mo. 1978).
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husband about their whereabouts, he offered several inconsis-
tent excuses. ° The mother's suspicions grew when she went to
her daughter's home and saw her daughter's purse, one the
daughter always carried with her, but could not locate her
daughter. The mother claimed she smelled an odor in the
house that she associated with death.22 Police officers went to
the daughter's house to investigate, but no one answered the
door.23 The officers then went to the home of a neighbor to
phone the daughter's work place and the school of one of her
daughter's children in an effort to locate them.2 When these
attempts were unsuccessful, an officer entered the house
through a window and found the bodies of the daughter and
her two children.m The court upheld the entry, which led to
the husband's conviction for three counts of first-degree mur-
der, by finding that the mother's report and the additional facts
.obtained by the police were sufficient to justify the entry.23
In applying the emergency doctrine to cases of missing per-
sons, some court opinions have suggested an additional factor
in determining if government use of the doctrine was proper.
That factor is the response speed of the police. For example,
the dissent in Epperson argued that the police response speed
showed that this situation was not an emergency, and empha-
sized the two and one-half hour delay between the time the offi-
cers were informed of the situation and their, entry into the
home. ' 7 While the dissent conceded that an emergency was
present at the time of the mother's initial report,2m it found the
officers' entry unreasonable because the delay suggested that
the officers were not treating the situation as an emergency. 2 9
no Id.
2 "'Id.
2'2 Id. See supra Part TI.2.h for a discussion of emergency arising from an odor of
a dead body.
2-" 571 S.W.2d. at 262.
W4 Id.
m Id. at 263.
"'Id. at 264.
2', Id. at 269-70 (Mo. 1978) (SeilerJ., dissenting).
"a Id. at 270.
"'9 Id. at 270, 272. See supra Part H.B for a discussion of officer's motivation in the
context of the emergency doctrine.
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The dissent felt that since the officers chose to attempt to locate
the daughter, rather than take immediate action such as forcibly
entering defendant's premises, the officers had time to obtain a
search warrant.20 Further, the dissent asserted that upholding
warrantless entries after such a delay does not promote prompt
police action in emergencies.24'
In an Oregon Supreme Court case, State v. Bridewel4 242 the
court followed the reasoning of the dissent in Epperson. In this
case, a friend of the defendant became concerned after he did
not return her phone message for several days.243 The friend
went to the defendant's house and discovered that the front
door was open.2" She noticed that the house was in disarray
and found an empty gun holster.24 Both of the defendant's ve-
hicles were missing.2 1 The friend could not locate the defen-
dant in his home or in his shop, located a few hundred yards
away.247 She reported her concerns to a sheriff's deputy around
10:00 P.M.248 Following department custom to wait until day-
light to begin an investigation, the deputy took no further ac-
tion until the next morning.249 The next day, two deputies went
to the house to search for the defendant.250 When the deputies
did not find him there, they entered his shop, and saw mari-
juana plants in plain view.251 The court suppressed this evidence
and held, due in part to the deputies' delay in taking action, no
valid emergency existed that could validate the warrantless en-
try. 2 The court noted that twelve hours had passed between
the time of the report and the action taken by the deputies.5
240 Id. at 271.
241 Id. at 270.
242 759 P.2d 1054 (Or. 1988).













Although the department custom required a delay in the inves-
tigation until daylight, they waited until 10:00 A.M. to take ac-
tion. The court found that this greatly dissipated the necessity
of immediate action and, therefore, there was no true emer-
gency.2 The court also suggested that the deputies could have
obtained a warrant during the early morning hours.25
While this additional factor concerning an officer's re-
sponse speed may at first glance appear to promote a finding of
immediacy, it is actually misleading in determining if a situation
was an emergency. As previously stated, the standard for de-
termining if an emergency existed is an objective, not a subjec-
tive, one.f5 In order to maintain a consistent standard in
missing persons cases, as in all others, courts should evaluate the
totality of the surrounding circumstances in deciding if an entry
was valid. Otherwise, in identical factual situations courts could
reach different conclusions based upon the responding officer's
response time. Furthermore, the very nature of missing persons
cases argues against an immediate action requirement. Since
adults are generally free to come and go as they please, which
might explain why they have temporarily disappeared, more
facts beyond the missing persons report are often necessary to
determine if there is an objectively reasonable basis to believe
that the person is in some sort of peril.
c) Kidnapping
Yet ;nother category in which courts have found the emer-
gency doctrine to be applicable is in response to a reported
kidnapping. Due to the inherently dangerous circumstances
which surround a kidnapping, most courts take the position that
when police officers receive a report of a kidnapping there is a
per se need for immediate action which warrants use of the
emergency doctrine.
In Oliver v. State,27 the court upheld a warrantless entry
where it took two days for officers to verify that the defendant
U4 Id.
25 Id.
See supra Parts IHA & MAI.
2 656 A.2d 1159 (D.C. 1995).
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had kidnapped a baby from a hospital. In Oliver, police officers
responded to a call from a hospital regarding a newborn baby
taken from the hospital nursery.2" The officers were told that
the defendant may have been a volunteer at the hospital nursery
on the day of the baby's disappearance.5 9 In addition, there was
a report that the defendant had told a friend she had just given
birth to a baby the very same day.2w The officers went to the de-
fendant's home to investigate,2 and brought along another
hospital volunteer to try to make an identification. 262 However,
the volunteer was unable to make a positive identification of the
woman at that time.2 The officers and the volunteer then re-
turned to the house an hour later so the volunteer could try to
identify the baby, but she was unable to do so. m The defendant
assured the police that the baby was hers and had been deliv-
ered by a Dr. Worth earlier that day in the hospital.2 The next
day, while attempting to verify this information with the hospi-
tal,2 the officers learned that there was no Dr. Worth on staff at
the hospital and that the defendant had not been a patient at
the hospital within the past five years.267 The officers returned
to the defendant's house to confront her with their findings,m
and when she was unable to offer any explanation, the officers
retrieved the baby.2 The baby was taken to the hospital for
identification while the defendant was taken to the police sta-
tion to face charges of kidnapping2 0
The appellate court upheld the entry under the emergency
exception. ' The court ruled that, unlike some other emer-
















gency categories where police officers are required to point to
articulable facts beyond the initial report to make a showing of a
reasonable need for immediate action,2  the very nature of a
kidnapping presents "unusually compelling circumstance [s]."27
The court noted that even if the victim is assumed safe at one
moment, there is a great risk that the situation may change and
the victim may be seriously harmed or even killed.24
In an adult kidnapping case, Chaney v. State,2 the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma also upheld a warrantless entry
by law enforcement officers under the emergency doctrine.f6
In this case, a man informed the FBI that he had received a ran-
som demand for the return of his wife.2 w The FBI made ar-
rangements to trace any additional calls made to the man.7
The next day, the man received a second call demanding ran-
som and explaining the procedure for payment of the ran-
Som. The call was traced to the defendant's residence.8
Later that evening, the kidnapper placed a third call during
which he accused the man of not following his demands and
threatened to kill the man's wife.21 The FBI traced this call to a
telephone booth where the defendant's palm print was later
discovered. 2 The law enforcement agents organized a raid of
the defendant's residence, where they found the bodies of the
man's wife and another woman.' The defendant was ultimately
convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death m
' See supra notes 218-19 (report of missing person usually requires consideration
of facts suggesting emergency actually exists).
2 3 Oliver, 656 A.2d at 1167.
274Id.
275 612 P.2d 269 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980).







2" Id. at 274, 277.
m Id. at 273.
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The court found that the warrantless raid of the defendant's
property was justified.2 The final ransom call gave the authori-
ties reason to believe that the woman was in great danger and
that her death was imminent.2  Emergency action was necessary
to minimize the likelihood of harm.f7
d) Child in Danger
Another important category where courts have upheld the
use of the emergency exception is in response to a report of a
child in danger. While many cases involving the safety of chil-
dren may also be classified in one of the other categories that
appear in this article,m some cases rest on circumstances unique
to children, such as reports of child abuse or neglect.m Courts
have consistently recognized the increased gravity of situations
involving children, who are generally less able to take care of
themselves than adults.m In fact, many states have statutory
authority justifying the removal of children from dangerous
situations.29 While it is unclear if this type of legislation stand-
ing alone is enough to justify a warrantless entry, it tends to lend
support to an officer's belief that he or she is justified in acting
under the emergency doctrine if a child is in danger. In any
event, if the totality of the circumstances give rise to a reason-
able belief that a child is in danger, it is appropriate for gov-
ernment agents to take immediate action. A report of a child
alone may or may not qualify as an emergency depending on
the location of the child, the length of time the child has been
left alone, and certainly, on the age of the child.
In People v. Malczewski, the Supreme Court of Colorado re-
jected the defendant's statutory immunity defense2 2 to a charge




" See, e.g., People v. Meddows, 427 N.E.2d 219, 222 (II. App. Ct. 1981).
"' See, e.g., State v. Garland, 636 A.2d 541, 548-49 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994)
(unattended children).
See, e.g., State v. Boggess, 340 N.W.2d 516,524 (Wis. 1983).
"'See, e.g., People v. Malczewski, 744 P.2d 62, 66 (Colo. 1987).
' Id. at 64; see CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-1-704.5, 8B (1986).
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lawfully in the defendant's home because of an emergency
situation. 8 In this case, a police officer on routine patrol was
flagged down by the defendant's wife.2 The wife told the offi-
cer that the defendant had taken their baby from the wife's
niece's house to their apartment.295 She said she was concerned
for the safety of the baby because her husband had been drink-
ing. She asked for the officer's assistance. 7 The officer went
to the apartment and knocked on the door.29 8 The defendant
did not open the door to the apartment, but instead opened the
screen to a window to ask the officer why he was there. The
officer heard a baby crying in the apartment. He told the de-
fendant that he was there to check on the baby.m Then, the de-
fendant, with the baby in his arms, opened the door to the
apartment.-"' The officer entered the doorway to talk to the de-
fendant?6 The officer was attempting to discuss the situation
with the defendant when the defendant suddenly began beating
the officer with his one free handm3 The officer was knocked
down and, after putting the baby down, the defendant began to
kick and hit the officer.3" The officer was injured in his head
and throat?35 Another man was also injured when he tried to
aid the officer and restrain the defendant.
6
The Supreme Court of Colorado overruled a lower court's
holding that the defendant was entitled to statutory immunity
from prosecution, and reversed the lower court's dismissal of
the chargesm7 The court stated that since the defendant was
'Mazwsk, 744 P.2d at 66.











raising the affirmative defense of statutory immunity, he was re-
quired to put forth the evidence to support the claim, and since
he failed to do so, the defense failed.-" In addition, the court
found that the police officer was lawfully in the defendant's
apartment addressing an emergency situation. The court
stated that, based on the wife's statements, the officer "had rea-
son to believe that an immediate crisis existed with respect to
the safety of the baby and that his entry into the apartment
would be helpful in alleviating that crisis."10 In addition, the
court cited statutory authority' which authorizes a law en-
forcement officer to take a child into temporary custody without
a court order when the child is in serious danger.1 2 The court
did not clarify whether the statute merely lent support to the of-
ficer's emergency entry or was an alternative justification for his
entry.
In a Wisconsin case, State v. Boggess, the court rejected a
government agent's reliance on a state statute to justify a war-
rantless entry in the defendant's home, but nonetheless upheld
the entry by government authorities under the emergency ex-
ception.1 4 In the case, a social worker received an anonymous
telephone call claiming that two children had been battered
and were in need of medical attention. 15 The caller identified
the children by name and told the worker that the children
lived with the defendant, who had a bad temper.1 6 The social
worker who received the call immediately telephoned another
social worker on duty that evening and that worker, accompa-
nied by a police officer for her protection, went to the defen-
dant's home to investigate.1 7 When the defendant answered the
door, the social worker informed him that she and the officer
30 Id. at 65.




.Id.; see COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-101(1)(b), 8B (1986).
"1 Mahmewski, 744 P.2d at 66.
SI3 340 N.W.2d 516 (Wis. 1983).
3" Id. at 520-25.





were there to check on the children's welfare 8" The defendant
asked if they had a warrant.319 The social worker stated the she
did not need a warrant under the Wisconsin Children's Code,
whereupon she and the officer entered the home.t20 Inside the
home, the social worker examined the children. 2' She observed
that both children were bruised32 One of the children, a boy,
was missing hair from the top of his head, had part of his lip
torn off and inflamed, and walked with a noticeable limp.32
The defendant stated that he had accidentally fallen on the boy
and, later, he said that he had spanked both children several
times.324 The children were immediately taken to a hospital
where they were treated and photographed.3 2 Later, the defen-
dant was charged with child abuse. The defendant filed a mo-
tion to suppress his statements made in the house, the
observations of the children by the social worker and the police
officer, and the photographs of the children taken at the hospi-
tal32 When the motion was denied, the defendant entered a
conditional plea of guilty to the charges8 2 He appealed the
admission of the evidence on the theory that the evidence was a
product of an illegal search 8
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the defendant's
conviction and found that the entry into the defendant's home
was valid under the emergency doctrine32 The court first noted
that the Children's Code does not expressly authorize a warrant-
less entry into a house, and that even if the authority was im-
plied in the statute, it could not supersede the United States
and Wisconsin State Constitutions' prohibitions against unrea-














sonable search and seizure.O However, the court then found
that the totality of the circumstances indicated that an emer-
gency existed which required the officer and social worker to
enter the home to aid the children.3 1 The court emphasized
that the anonymous caller provided detailed information about
the children, indicated that he knew the defendant, and had
personally witnessed the children's injuries.8 2 In addition, when
the defendant answered the door, he did not deny that the
children lived there, but instead asked the social worker if she
had a warrant.38 The court found this provided corroboration
for at least a portion of the informant's report.M The court fur-
ther emphasized that these were "small children inside a home,
who are less able to protect themselves from further harm or to
independently seek medical attention than are adults."33 In ad-
dition, the defendant's reported bad temper created the possi-
bility that the children could be injured further at any time.
3 6
The court concluded that it was reasonable for the officer and
social worker to believe that there was an immediate need to en-
ter the home to aid the children.8 7
Similarly, in State v. Garland,38M the court found that a report
of unattended children constituted an emergency.8 9 In that
case, two police officers were on routine patrol when they no-
ticed a suspicious vehicleM After observing the driver make an
improper lane change, the officers pulled along side of the ve-
hicleM They then noticed a small girl slouched down in the
passenger seat. Remaining in their car, the officers questioned
the driver through the window about the identity of the girl.M2
" Id. at 520.
-" Id. at 525.






' 636 A.2d 541 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
9 Id. at 548.





The driver claimed to be a friend of the child's mother, but he
was unable to tell the officers the child's name or her address.
3
The officers proceeded to curb the car based on the improper
lane change and out of concern for the child.5" The driver was
found holding an open beer can and could not produce a
driver's license. The officers then performed a protective frisk
of the driver and discovered a bag of drugs.3 The officers ar-
rested the driver and placed him in the back of the squad car.m6
Immediately after the arrest, the officers questioned the girl
about her identity. The girl said that the driver was her
mother's friend, but she did not know his name.m7 The girl said
that she had not seen her mother in two days. She also claimed
to have just been at a party at a local motel, which the officers
recognized for its reputation for prostitution. 8 The girl told
the officers that other children were still at the motel and that
they were left alone in a room of the motel.39 Using a motel key
found on the driver, the officers went to the motel room to lo-
cate the other children.?0 When they knocked on the motel
room door, the officers received no answer. 1 The officers en-
tered and discovered two adult women, two children, and large
quantities of narcotics in plain view." The children were un-
harmed. 35 The officers seized the drugs and arrested the
women, who, along with the driver, were later found guilty of
various drug-related charges. "
The court upheld the warrantless entry into the motel room
on the basis of the emergency exception.M 5 The court stated
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an emergency.3 This finding was based, in part, on the fact
that leaving children unattended is deemed by the New Jersey
legislature to be such a substantial threat to their safety that it is
grounds for criminal prosecution in that state.57 While this
holding seemed to imply that any instance of an unattended
child is sufficiently serious to justify use of the emergency excep-
tion, it is important to note that the court also emphasized par-
ticular facts in this case that substantiated their finding of an
emergency"8 The officers knew the girl had not seen her
mother for two days and that two other children were alone in a
motel known for prostitution" 9
e) Report of a Possible Assault in Progress
A report of an assault in progress may also permit the use of
the emergency doctrine. In United States v. Booth, a police offi-
cer received a radio report of an assault in progress at a private
residence." ° The officer went to the address and knocked on
the doorml The defendant answered and the officer noticed
dried blood on the defendant's nose, which the defendant
would not explainm2 The officer testified that he then entered
the house to see if anyone inside was injured.- Once inside,
the officer observed a man whose face was covered in blood and
who claimed that the defendant had attacked him.6 As a result,
the officer placed the defendant under arrest*65 The court held
that the officer's warrantless entry was valid under the emer-
gency exception.- The assault report and the unexplained














one inside might have been injured and in need of his assis-
tance.s 7
In State v. Gilbert, the court held that a report of domestic
violence justified a police officer's entry into defendant's home
to aid the victim of the domestic abuse inside.m In that case, a
neighbor of the defendant reported to police that defendant
had just hit her and defendant's wife.- The Defendant's wife
met the officer as he approached the home. She had a swollen
lip and was very upset emotionally.370 However, she told the of-
ficer that the defendant was not home and insisted that the offi-
cer not enterYs' Based on the officer's experiences with
domestic violence, he believed that defendant's wife might be
hiding the defendant inside their home and that further vio-
lence might be inflicted upon the wife by the defendant and,
consequently, he entered the home, eventually discovering
marijuana plants.3 72 Here, the domestic violence report, com-
bined with the officer's experience with this form of criminality,
justified the officer's entry.3 73 Thus, the court of appeals re-
versed the trial court's decision to grant a motion to suppress
the marijuana, stemming from defendant's prosecution for the
marijuana activity.s74
f) Report of Person with Gun or Gunfire
The emergency doctrine may also apply when the police re-
spond to a report of a person brandishing a gun, or a report of
gunfire. Display, or even possession of a gun in certain places375
or by certain individuals376 may be per se illegal. Display of a
367 Id.
'0 942 P.2d 660, 666 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997).
'




37 Id. at 666.
374 i'd
3 See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. §5/24-1(a) (10) (West 1997) (carrying or possessing
a firearm on public property within a city or town prohibited except under certain
circumstances).
376 See, e.g., 720 ILL. CoMP. STAT. §5/24-1.1(West 1997) (convicted felons).
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gun in a bank or the report of gunfire in a residence should, of
course, prompt immediate police inquiry.3 Obviously, this type
of situation may present an immediate danger to the person
making the report or to others. However, since handling a gun
and discharging a gun in some situations, such as at a shooting
range or hunting preserve may be entirely legal, police may be
required to verify if the situation poses a threat to life or limb.
The following cases illustrate some of the ways in which officers
can determine that a report of a person with a gun or gunfire
poses a threat to personal safety and, concomitantly, take action
consistent with their obligation to protect society from harm.
In State v. Klauss, the defendant was speaking to his girl-
friend on the telephone.38 The girlfriend believed that the de-
fendant was angry and intoxicated. She claimed to hear the
sound of a gun firing in the background and she feared that the
defendant might harm himself.- The police were notified of
the situation and, consequently, officers were sent to the defen-
dant's residence to investigate." Upon arriving at the defen-
dant's house, the officers met the defendant's roommates
outside.' 2 The roommates told the police that they did not
know the defendant's whereabouts, but they believed that he
was not at home because they had been unsuccessful in prevent-
ing him from leaving the house.m However, when the room-
mates admitted there were guns in the house,m the police
entered the house to search for the defendant and discovered
marijuana in plain view.m The court upheld this warrantless en-
try, which ultimately led to the defendant's conviction for pos-
session of marijuana, under the emergency exception.6
"" See, e.g., People v. DePaula, 579 N.Y.S.2d 10, 12 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (gunfire is
cause for police inquiry, and for entry for purpose of offering aid to person in need).
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The following three cases illustrate the judiciary's willing-
ness to uphold immediate police action in the face of a cor-
roborated report of gunfire or a person with a gun. In People v.
Isaac, two police officers were responding to a report of a man
with a gun when they heard screams coming from inside an
apartment! s7 The officers knocked on the door of the apart-
ment.' The defendant opened the door and the officers saw a
bruised woman standing inside.8 The officers also saw the de-
fendant toss a silver object to the floor 8 O One officer grabbed
the defendant and the other officer stepped into the apart-
ment. 91 The officer observed a weapon in plain view and seized
it, ammunition, a fake police shield, and handcuffs. 92 In affirm-
ing defendant's conviction, the appellate court held the entry
was permissible under the emergency doctrine and these items
were properly seized. 93
In People v. Love, officers responded to a report of a man
with a gun in a hotel room.39 When police knocked on the
door, a woman answered and immediately tried to slam the
door shut when she saw the officers. 95 The officers entered the
room and discovered guns and narcotics in plain view.89 Again,
the appellate court upheld the warrantless search under the
emergency doctrine and affirmed the defendant's conviction
for possession of a controlled substance. 97
Finally, in People v. DePaula, the police received reports of
shots being fired in a particular apartment in an apartment
building.9 8 When police knocked on the defendant's door, the
defendant answered, but refused to allow the police to enter to
"7599 N.Y.S.2d 113, 113-14 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).










39 579 N.Y.S.2d 10 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
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investigate.5 9 The defendant tried to slam the door shut and
was otherwise acting suspiciously.& The police entered and
found money, drugs, and a weapon.4' Here too, the entry was
deemed proper and the defendant's motion to suppress the
confiscated evidence was denied on appeal4 2
In all of the cases in this section, the officers were acting on
tips that prompted them to investigate a potentially dangerous
situation. In each, the emergency exception was properly in-
voked because these tips, in combination with other factors, led
the officers to reasonably believe that an emergency was occur-
ring, and that immediate action had to be taken to aid some-
one. Also, these cases seem to suggest that an anonymous or
unsubstantiated tip of firearms or gunfire alone is not enough
to warrant use of the emergency exception, because a tip could
be fabricated by officers or others with improper motives. How-
ever, in each of these cases, the officers were found to be acting
with proper corroborating evidence. For example, in Klauss,
the court emphasized that the officers were acting not just on
the girlfriend's report, but on the totality of the circum-
stances.4°3 The defendant was reported to be intoxicated and
upset.4 There was a report of gunfire, and a confirmation that
guns were present in the house.4 Furthermore, the defen-
dant's whereabouts were unknown.4 In Isaac, the situation was
escalated from a mere report of a man with a gun to an emer-
gency situation when the officers heard screams and saw an in-
jured woman inside the apartment.47 Finally, the courts in Love
and DePaula held that the suspicious behavior of the parties




401 Id. at 11.
02 id.





People v. Issac, 599 N.Y.S.2d 113, 114 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
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tips, led the officers to reasonably believe that something was
wrong inside. 4°
g) Report of Possible Homicide
Another situation where courts have upheld warrantless en-
tries under the emergency doctrine is when police respond to a
report of a possible homicide or suicide.4 0 The United States
Supreme Court has expressly rejected a per se "murder scene"
exception to the warrant requirement.4 1 0 However, courts have
found that in situations where the death of the victim is uncer-
tain, police officers are reasonable in entering a dwelling to aid
a dying or critically injured victim.
4 11
In the United States Supreme Court case of Mincey v. Ari-
zona, an undercover narcotics agent had arranged to purchase
heroin from the defendant. The agent went to the defen-
dant's apartment accompanied by other officers. 41 3 An acquain-
tance of the defendant opened the door for the agent, who
quickly went in to the bedroom.1 4 Immediately thereafter, the
other officers heard a series of shots from the bedroom. 41 5 The
agent exited the bedroom and collapsed from gunshot wounds
in front of the officers.416 The agent died of these wounds a few
hours later.417 The officers who were present during the shoot-
ing searched the apartment for other victims and found a
wounded woman in the bedroom closet, and the defendant un-
People v. Love, 610 N.Y.S.2d 958, 958 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); People v. DePaula,
579 N.Y.S.2d 10, 11-12 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
See, e.g., State v. Terrell, 283 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. 1979) (report of possible
homicide).410 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). The Arizona Supreme Court had
earlier reaffirmed and clarified the a so-called "murder scene" exception to the war-
rant requirement. State v. Mincey, 566 P.2d 275, 283 (1977), revld, 437 U.S. 385
(1978).
41 See, e.g., Tem-elL 283 N.W.2d at 532 ("while the information indicated that a
homicide has occurred.., it was possible that the victim, if there was a victim, might
still be alive").













conscious on the bedroom floor. 8 The officers called for aid
for the injured people and secured the premises.4 1 9 Homicide
detectives arrived at the apartment within ten minutes and took
control of the investigation.l The detectives proceeded to
search the entire apartment.' The search lasted four days and
was exhaustive, including searches of drawers, closets, cup-
boards, and clothing pockets.4 In addition, the detectives dug
bullet fragments out of the floors and walls and took carpet
samples for examination. z
The Supreme Court began its analysis by recognizing the
obligations of police officers to respond to emergency situa-
tions. 4 The Court acknowledged that officers may enter to aid
a victim, to search for other victims, or to see if an alleged killer
is still on the premises.4 However, the Court ruled that police
officers are not justified in making a warrantless search, such as
the four-day extensive search in this case, simply because a
homicide had recently occurred at the location.2 The Court
held the homicide detectives' search impermissible because the
narcotics officers had already located all of the potentially in-
jured people in the apartment before the extensive search be-
gan.4 Thus, the presence of a possible murder scene was
deemed' insufficient for a per se exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement.4
It is important to contrast Mincey with cases where the police
action in question is predicated on a reasonable belief that a
crime victim on private premises may still be alive. In Patrick v.
State42 , police were called to the scene by a report from the vic-
418 Id. at 387-88.
419 Id. at 388.
4 Id. at 388-89.
4' Id. at 389.
M id.
M id.
"4 Id. at 392.
425 I-d.
4 Id. at 395.
7Id. at 393.
4"Id. at 395.
M 227 A.2d 486 (Del. 1967).
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tim's employer."0 The employer stated that he found the victim
in bed with a serious head injury.3 ' The employer was unsure if
the victim was alive or dead."2 The police officers immediately
entered the victim's apartment and discovered the victim's body
and evidence of the murder in plain view.4"
The court upheld this warrantless entry by noting that re-
ports of death may be inaccurate.' The court stated that there
may be an occasion where "a spark of life remains" in the victim
and officers may still be able to offer aid. 43 The officers in this
case were not certain that the victim was dead when they en-
tered the apartment, therefore, their belief that emergency as-
sistance might be needed was reasonable.M
Similarly, in State v. Gosser, a woman reported to police that
she had received a disturbing phone call from her friend's hus-
band.47 The husband was upset and told the woman that, in ef-
fect, something terrible had happened."' An officer was sent to
the home of the couple to investigate.4"9 The husband answered
the door."0 He was crying and his face and clothing were caked
in blood." ' When the husband told the officer that he had
killed his wife, the officer immediately called headquarters for
assistance."' Once the additional officers had arrived, the hus-
band told them that he had shot his wife and that she was up-
stairs. 3 The police quickly searched the upstairs rooms until
they found the wife's body.4" The court held that the officers'






















search was justified. 5 The officers were reasonable in going up-
stairs to determine if the wife was still alive and in need of assis-
tance."6
In Maxey v. State, officers received a call of a disturbance at a
house." The responding officers were met at the door of the
house by the defendant's mother"6 The officers later testified
that the mother appeared excited and informed them that her
son had just killed his wife." 9 In contrast, the mother later testi-
fied that she did not know if the wife was dead and that she had
only told the officers that there had been a fight.4' In any
event, the officers entered the house and found the defendant
in the kitchen.41 The defendant told the officers that he had
killed his wife and that her body was lying in the basement. 2
The officers went to the basement and found the wife's body.4
3
The court found that the entry was justified and held that the
police were reasonable in their belief that someone in the house
could have been in need of assistance.4 Therefore, the police
were justified in entering to aid the injured or to prevent fur-
ther injury.45
In conclusion, while the scene of a possible criminal homi-
cide does not per se excuse the necessity of police procurement
of a warrant, circumstances which suggest a homicide victim
may still be alive and in need of aid will normally excuse this re-
quirement.
h) Odor of a Dead Body
Another group of cases which have upheld warrantless en-
tries under the emergency exception are those cases which in-
4 Id. at 382.
47 244 N.E.2d 650, 652 (Ind. 1969).
40 Id.
449 id.
*" Id. The court found that the search wasjustified in either instance. IR at 653.







volve a report of the odor of a dead body. Courts have upheld
warrantless entries despite the seeming lack of need for imme-
diate emergency aid for the deceased victim. These entries are
justified on the uncertainty of whether or not the possible dece-
dent is, in fact, dead.
In People v. Brooks, a janitor reported to police an unusual
odor coming from the defendant's apartment.46 The respond-
ing officers also noticed the odor, which they identified as being
the odor of a dead body.47 The officers entered the apartment
and found the defendant's mother's body on the couch.48 The
defendant was later convicted of her murder.49 The court held
that the officers acted properly because they were not sure of
the victim's status.4w The court stated that the offensive odor
may have indicated the victim was dead or, alternatively, severely
burned or injured, and in need of aid.461
In another case decided by an Illinois appellate court, People
v. McGee, a police officer investigated a report of a foul odor and
barking dogs at the defendant's residence.42 Upon arrival at
the scene, the officer immediately noticed a foul odor coming
from within the house.4 Receiving no answer when he
knocked on the door of the house, the officer looked in the
window.4 He observed that the house was in disarray.4 There
were animal cages strewn about the house, and there were sev-
eral animals in cages without food or water.4 He also noticed
insects flying around inside the premises. 4' The officer then
entered through the back door.' The officer testified that the
overwhelming stench along with the disarray of the house led





9 Id. at 207.4W id.
461 
Id.
-2 489 N.E.2d 439,440 (M1l. App. Ct. 1986).
4 Id. at 44041.








him to believe that a dead body might be inside.'6 Inside the
house, the officer discovered the body of a dog which had been
dead for over a week.470 The defendant was subsequently found
guilty in the trial court of failure to dispose of a dead animal.47'
The court held that the officer acted properly under the
emergency doctrinef Although the officer believed that the
odor was coming from a dead body of a human, the uncertainty
of the situation justified the entry.7 This court also noted that
the odor may have been caused by a person with "severe bums
or other injuries."' 4
In contrast, in State v. Epperson, the court stated that the
smell of decomposing flesh would clearly indicate that at least
one victim was dead, thereby undermining the necessity for
immediate police action.475 Nevertheless, the court went on to
uphold the entry in question on the basis that there were three
missing persons in the case under review and, therefore, there
was a possibility that one or more of the missing persons were
still alive and in need of aidY.
In each of these cases, the court emphasized the uncertainty
of the situation. In the abstract, it would appear that if the offi-
cers are certain that the victim is dead there would be no im-
mediate need for aid and, therefore, no emergency. However,
this degree of certainty is nearly impossible to attain. Conse-
quently, a seemingly dead body normally qualifies as giving rise
to an emergency even in circumstances where the victim died of
natural causes. However, cases involving death by natural
causes are less likely to involve the discovery of evidence of a
crime and, consequently, those situations are less likely to be
challenged in court. In addition, officers making warrantless
entries based on the presence of a dead body would still be sub-
449 id.
4 Id. at 440.
47 id.
M Id. at 442.
47 id.
474 




ject to the other restrictions of the emergency doctrine, such as
its limited scope.
Up to now, this article has focused on police officers' ac-
tions in emergency situations involving potential threats to citi-
zens' personal safety. The following categories involve both
threats to people and property. In most of the published cases,
the danger to property interests also carries a possible threat to
life or limb. One example is a report of a burglary in progress.
i) Burglary in Progress
Most courts have applied the emergency doctrine in cir-
cumstances where police reasonably believe that a burglary is in
progress or has recently occurred.4 w In this context, courts have
upheld warrantless entries into both residential4V7 and commer-
cial premises.47
For instance, in Bryant v. State, the Supreme Court of Indi-
ana stated that the emergency exception is operable in the con-
text of a burglary because the "emergency circumstances
surrounding a potential burglary justify the action."0 In Bryant,
police arrived at the defendant's residence after a neighbor re-
ported hearing a home alarm system.48' When police ap-
proached the house, they discovered the door was open and saw
fresh pry marks on it. 482 The police entered and, although they
found no one inside the residence, they discovered over 250
, See, e.g., Reardon v. Wroan, 811 F.2d 1025, 1029 (7th Cir. 1992) (In burglary in
progress case in which the police entered a fraternity house without a warrant, the
court held that police judgments regarding whether to obtain a warrant before enter-
ing a dwelling, where a crime has been reported to be in progress, should be ac-
corded a degree of deference.); State ex irL Zander v. District Court, 591 P.2d 656,
659 (Mont. 1979) (After police received a report of a burglary in progress, they en-
tered the residence and did not find a burglar, but found marijuana plants being
grown inside the residence; officers were reasonable in entering the dwelling to pro-
tect the owners property without a warrant, and resultant discovery of marijuana up-
held).
4
73 See Zande, 591 P.2d at 659.
, See, e.g., People ex rL Waller v. Seeberg Slot Machines, 641 N.E.2d 997 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1994).





marijuana plants in plain view throughout the basement and
the back yard.
4 as
The defendant challenged the police entry of his residence
as a Fourth Amendment violation.' The court said the police
entry was permissible because the police reasonably believed
that a burglary was in progress or had recently been commit-
ted.4 The court was convinced that the neighbor's report of an
alarm sounding, plus an open door with fresh pry marks, pro-
vided the police with a reasonable belief that a burglary was in
progress4s6 Accordingly, the court stated that the police were
entitled to search any area in which it was reasonable to believe
a burglar might be hiding.487 Interestingly, however, the court
rejected the government's initial argument that the entry was
justified because the police thought there was a person inside
who needed immediate assistance.4 In doing so, the court rea-
soned that no objective facts existed to support the officers' be-
lief that a violent crime was being committed .4
In a similar case, People v. Duncan, the Supreme Court of
California ruled that police could enter a residence to halt a
burglary in progress under the emergency exception, which the
court characterized as a variation of exigent circumstances. 490 In
Duncan, a police officer responded to a call of a burglary in pro-
gress.4 11 As the officer approached the defendant's residence,
he saw a box containing a television and other items under an
open window.4 9 The officer found that the doors of the resi-
dence were locked, so he climbed through the open window to
," Id. at 294.
4 Id. at 300.
UId at 301.
W Id.
Id. Although the court used the words "violent crime," it also stated that the en-
try was justified because the officers reasonably believed a burglary was in progress.
Although burglary might be considered an inherently violent crime by some, in this
context, the court meant that there were no facts to support a belief that a violent
crime against a person was being committed.
49* 720 P.2d 2, 5-6 (Cal. 1986).
491 Id. at 3.
4" M at 4.
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see if the burglars were still inside.4 3 Although the officer
found none in the house, the officer did discover what was later
identified as a lab used to manufacture methamphetamine.4 4
The officer then called his sergeant to the scene to help identify
the chemicals.4 9 The officer procured a search warrant based
on his and other officers' observations. 49 The defendant ulti-
mately pled guilty to various drug charges.497 The court upheld
the responding officer's entry under the emergency doctrine
49
by finding that specific and articulable facts, including the re-
port of a burglary in progress and the box containing a televi-
sion sitting below an open window, supported the officer's
belief that burglars remained inside the house.49 The court also
upheld the entry of the sergeant on the grounds that the re-
sponding officer had a reasonable suspicion that illegal activity
was occurring in the apartment, but needed his sergeant to con-
firm that suspicion. .
In People ex rel. Waller v. Seeburg Slot Machines, police entered
a vacant office building at approximately 8:00 A.M. after they
had noticed a hole in an eight by eight foot window at the
ground level.5  The police decided to secure the building since
the hole in the window was large enough to allow a person to
enter the building, and the police were aware of a rash of bur-
glaries in the area.502 They entered through the window, and
found no one on the first floor.508 Once on the second floor,
the officers observed two rooms full of slot machines, but found
no indication of a burglary.5 4 At 8:45 A.M., the caretaker of the





9 Id. at 5-6.
499 id..
"Id. at7.
"'Seebug Slot Machines, 641 N.E.2d at 1004.
"Id.
505Id
' Id. at 1000.
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both the building and the slot machines!su The officers seized
the machines since they are illegal gaming devices under state
law.5 6 These devices later became the subject of a civil forfei-
ture proceeding."
The appellate court held that the emergency doctrine ap-
plied in this case because the break in the window was large
enough to allow a person to enter the building, which the offi-
cers knew had been vacant for a number of years, and because
of the rash of recent burglaries in the area. °8 The court re-
jected the defendant's argument that no legitimate emergency
existed in the absence of screams for help or signs of rocks or
blood around the broken window509 The court noted that not
all police entries into commercial premises during non-business
hours are justified under the emergency doctrine, 10 but found
the officers' belief that an immediate threat to person or prop-
erty might exist1 to be reasonable in light of the particular facts
of the case. Thus, the officers were justified in entering the
building to secure the premises, and lawfully seized the slot ma-
chines which were in plain view.5
A possible burglary in progress presents both community
caretaking and law enforcement concerns concurrently. Obvi-




Id. at 1002. The court noted that the exclusionary rule applied notwithstanding
the fact that this is a civil forfeiture proceeding. See Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,
380 U.S. 693, 696 (1965) (exclusionary rule applicable in civil forfeiture hearing).
People ex r/L Waller v. Seeburg Slot Machines, 641 N.E.2d 997, 1004 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1994).
m0 Id.
50 Id. The court stated that the police entered during non-business hours. The
entry took place on a Saturday at around 8:00 A.M. The court does not specify
whether a vacant building ever has business hours, or in any event, how business
hours are determined for a particular commercial building.
", Id. Although the court used the language "threat to person or property," it
seemingly upheld the officers' entry solely to protect the owner's property interests,
since there is no indication that anyone's safety was in danger. This is especially true
since the building had been vacant for years and the entry was during non-business
hours. Moreover, the entry was prompted by a broken window rather than a report
or observation of suspicious persons.
512 m
"
3 Id. at 1005.
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and endangered by the burglar. In addition, substantial loss of
property often occurs as a result of a burglary and, thus, the
threat to the burglary victim's property justifies the immediate
police action as well. In addition, the interest in the possible
immediate apprehension of the perpetrator who may remain at
the scene is an important law enforcement goal. Thus, if police
were unable to investigate the scene of a possible burglary until
the property owner later provides police authorization to enter
the premises to investigate, the burglar still on the scene who
hides until after the police depart and before the property
owner returns would most likely successfully escape with his
bounty and continue to rob the homes and businesses of future
victims. Expecting the police to merely keep the house under
surveillance to guard against, on the one hand, the possible es-
cape of the burglar, and, on the other hand, the invasion of the
privacy of the absent property owner would involve a waste of
police resources that no court would expect.
j) Explosion or Fire in Progress
An explosion or fire in private premises is an obvious exam-
ple of an emergency which permits police and firefighters to
take action necessary to protect the premises and persons en-
dangered by the fire or explosion. 4 While legitimately on the
premises to extinguish a blaze, these officials may discover evi-
dence of arson515 or evidence of other criminality.
516
The United States Supreme Court case of Michigan v. Tyl 5 7
illustrates the parameters of appropriate government control
and investigation of a fire. In that case, firefighters were dis-
patched around midnight to a furniture store to extinguish a
fire.518 While fighting the fire, firefighters came across two con-
tainers of flammable liquid and summoned the police, who
"" See, e.g., Steigler v. Anderson, 496 F.2d 793, 797 (3rd Cir. 1974) (fire created
emergency).
See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 500 (1978).
5 See, e.g., Mazen v. Seidel, 940 P.2d 923, 925 (Ariz. 1997)(firefighter discovery
and police seizure of marijuana upheld).
117 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
"a & at 501.
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seized the containers as possible evidence of arson. 9 Police and
firefighters then briefly scanned the rest of the building in an
attempt to determine the exact cause of the fire.5' Due to
darkness and smoke, the officials were not able to establish the
fire's origin and, consequently, evacuated the premises around
4:00 A.M. after verifying that the fire was completely extin-
guished .5
Later that morning, police and firefighters re-entered the
premises without a warrant several times to further investigate
the cause of the fire. 5  During those entries, police seized
pieces of a rug and bits of the stairway as evidence suggestive of
a fuse trail?2 More than three weeks later, police again made
repeated visits to the scene to investigate and to obtain evidence
against the defendants, the owners of the store, who were
charged with conspiracy to commit arson.2 The police had nei-
ther a warrant nor consent for any of these various entries.J At
trial, the defendants moved to suppress all evidence obtained af-
ter the initial entry as the fruits of illegal warrantless searches.
5 2
The Supreme Court noted that a fire in progress, of course,
was an obvious emergency permitting immediate governmental
action.' However, the Court pointed out that owners of fire-
damaged premises, whether commercial or residential, which
are not completely destroyed, continue to have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in their premises even after the exigency of
the fire has passed. a Thus, the Fourth Amendment is applica-
ble in this context, and government officials must obtain a war-
rant to conduct a search of the premises for origin of the fire or





52 Id. at 503.
2 Id at 502-03.
127 Id. at 509.
5
2, Id. at 505-06.
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evidence of arson in the absence of either consent or an appli-
cable exception to the warrant requirement."s
In Tyler, the Court not only stated that the emergency ex-
ception unquestionably allowed officials to immediately enter a
burning building to extinguish a fire'5 0 but also ruled that po-
lice and fire officials may remain on the premises for a reason-
able time after the fire has been extinguished for the purpose of
investigating the cause of the blaze. In other words, officials
may remain to gain assurance that the fire will not rekindle. Fi-
nally, what constitutes a reasonable time is decided based on the
various circumstances at hand.3 2 Examining the facts of the
case, the Court held that since the subsequent entries that day
occurred only four hours after fire officials and police aban-
doned their investigation at 4:00 A.M. due to darkness and
smoke, these entries were no different than if the officials had
remained on the premises until the smoke cleared and daylight
dawned in order to complete their investigation.53 3 Thus, the
early morning re-entries were reasonable in light of the police
and firefighters' duty to determine the cause of the fire.53 All
later entries, however, were "clearly detached from the initial
exigency and warrantless entry,"5u and all evidence gained dur-
ing those entries was deemed inadmissible because the police
failed to obtain consent or a valid administrative or criminal
536
search warrant, or to satisfy an applicable warrant exception.
While the Supreme Court established the "reasonable time
afterwards" extension of the emergency doctrine in the context
52 Id. at 504-06. The Court listed as government officials law enforcement officers,
health and fire officials, and building inspectors.
" Id. at 509.
"'Id. at 510.
"'Id. at 510 & n.6.
"'Id. at 511.
" Moreover, the search was limited to sifting through the rubble for signs of the
cause of the fire. Id. at 502.
"' Id. at 511. An administrative search warrant is required for entries to examine





of subsequent entries,537 other courts have applied it to decide
the reasonableness of the duration of the original entry. For ex-
ample, in People v. Harpes firefighters were called to defen-
dant's residence to extinguish a fire. After the fire was
extinguished, the firefighters determined that a smoldering
mattress caused the fire and removed it.5 s 9 While removing the
mattress, one of the firefighters noticed a bucket containing
what he thought was marijuana. ° He contacted the police, who
arrived shortly thereafter and seized the contraband.51
The Supreme Court of Colorado relied on Tyler, finding
that the firefighters entered the premises pursuant to an emer-
gency and were thereby entitled to remain for a reasonable time
to investigate the cause of the fire. Since the marijuana was
discovered in plain view during the investigation of the cause of
the fire, it was held to be a valid seizure occurring within a rea-
sonable time after the fire was extinguished . Thus, even
though Harper uses the "reasonable time afterwards" language
from Tyler, it really seems to be a straightforward application of
the emergency exception since the evidence was discovered in
plain view during the original entry.
In People v. Van Middlesworth, 54 the court addressed the
scope of legitimate entry and search when the fire only ex-
tended to one room of the house. In this case, firefighters ex-
545
tinguished the fire before it spread beyond the living room.
They then proceeded to open windows throughout the house
for ventilation.' While doing so, one of the firefighters noticed
marijuana in plain view in the defendant's bedroom.547 Soon
... The "reasonable time afterward" component of the emergency exception is fully
discussed in the section dealing with the scope of the emergency exception. See infra
Part mI.C.3.
" 902 P.2d 842 (Colo. 1995.
Id. at 843.
" Id. at 844.
542d.
3 Id. at 845.
44 533 N.E.2d 1119 (M1l. App. Ct. 1988).





thereafter, a police officer entered the residence in search of
the fire chief and noticed drug paraphernalia in the defen-
dant's bedroom.S The court upheld the seizure since the offi-
cer entered the home pursuant to his duties at the fire scene
and had noticed the contraband in plain view. 9
Similarly, some court decisions involve a police response to
a report of an explosion. For example, in United States v. Boett-
ger, the police were called to investigate an explosion at the de-
fendant's residence.550 The defendant informed the police that
he was making a firecracker in his apartment when the chemical
explosion occurred.-" The defendant, who had lost a hand and
a couple of fingers as a result of the explosion, was taken to the
hospital . The police entered his apartment and determined
that the explosion happened in the kitchen.5 3 They also no-
ticed a crock pot with containers of clear liquid, a device with
coiled wires that looked like a still, and what appeared to be a
bomb in a glass bottle 0 Accordingly, the officers evacuated the
apartment.5 Since the local police were unable to determine
the extent of the danger posed by the mixture of chemicals in
the apartment, they called the state police, who arrived within
two hours.5 Thereafter, all three surrounding apartment build-
ings were evacuated.5 7
Still unsure about the potential for an explosion, authorities
at the scene called agents from the Federal Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) for assistance, who arrived the
next day, but were unable to dismantle the devices.558 Finally, an
explosives expert with over twenty years of experience was flown
5
48 Id.
" Id. at 1121.











in from another jurisdiction to neutralize the explosives.5 9 He
arrived the evening after the explosion. ° Thus, in an effort to
prevent another explosion, several officials from different gov-
ernmental agencies entered the apartment over the course of
the next two days. 1 Once the officials removed the explosives,
the defendant's neighbors were allowed to return. 6 The de-
fendant was charged with making and possessing twenty-five ex-
plosive devices, and possessing one unregistered firearm
silencer.56 He challenged all of the entries as Fourth Amend-
ment violations.56
The Eighth Circuit upheld the entries under the emergency
doctrine, relying on the premise that government officials can
take reasonable measures to alleviate a continuing danger.s
The court began by noting that the defendant's experimenta-
tion with explosives in his apartment diminished his expectation
of privacy because of the danger it created for others.5 It also
emphasized that each entry was made to ascertain the cause of
the explosion and to prevent any further explosion.6 7 Moreo-
ver, once an agent arrived who had the expertise necessary to
neutralize the chemicals and devices, they were removed and no
further entries were made.m The court here equated the dan-
ger in this situation to that of the danger of a fire rekindling af-
ter it is extinguished,m and held that all of the entries were






Id. at 1414 ("The reasonableness of a search will depend on 'the circumstances
of the particular [hazard] and generally will involve more than the lapse of time or





-" Id. at 1416.
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curred while the materials posed a continuing threat to the pub-
lic.
570
k) Presence of Explosive Devices
Similar emergency situations occur when police are in-
formed of the whereabouts of dangerous explosive devices.57' In
People v. Higbee, the Supreme Court of Colorado determined
that a colorable claim of emergency existed when police had
probable cause to believe the defendant had taken dynamite
into an apartment complex.57 Prior to the search, the police
had arranged an undercover drug transaction between the de-
fendant and an informant, who had worked for the police on
several prior occasions5 7 The drug deal took place in the de-
fendant's car, which was under police surveillance.57 4 Afterward,
the informant told the police that she saw a toggle switch and
two red tubes in the defendant's car, and that when she ques-
tioned him, he replied that the tubes were dynamite.57 5 He fur-
ther stated that the toggle switch could be set to detonate the
dynamite if anyone tampered with his car, or that he could set it
to detonate after a thirty-second delay, allowing himself time to
escape before the explosion. 6
Based on this information, the police obtained an arrest
warrant for the defendant. The next day, the police located the
defendant's car at an apartment complex and observed the de-
fendant and some other persons carrying packages from the car
into one of the apartments.5 7 The police then promptly ar-
rested the defendant and called the bomb squad.578 The bomb
'
7 0 Id. at 1415-17.
" See, e.g., People v. Meddows, 427 N.E.2d 219 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (dynamite acces-
sible to playing children posed emergency; resultant seizure and murder conviction
upheld).
' 802 P.2d 1085, 1091 (Colo. 1990).








squad instructed the police to evacuate the area.579 At this time,
the defendant denied having possession of any dynamite and
also denied making the statements to the informant.5 ° He ex-
plained that the toggle switch was used to bypass a short cir-
cuit."  An officer from the bomb squad then searched the
defendant's car and verified that the toggle switch bypassed a
short circuit in the ignition!" However, he found no explosives
in the car. The officers, concerned that the defendant had
moved the explosives into the apartment complex, proceeded
to search the apartment.- Within the premises were a military
hand grenade simulator and controlled substances, but no ex-
plosives.58 The defendant challenged this entry as a Fourth
Amendment violation." 6
The court began its analysis by stating that probable cause
and exigent circumstances must be present before the police
could lawfully enter the residence without a warrant.5 7 The
court defined probable cause as reasonable grounds to believe
that the item sought is in the place to be searched88 Further, it
explained that exigent circumstances exist where there is "a
colorable claim of an emergency threatening the life or safety of
another."519 Moreover, the court added that an emergency ex-
isted when there was an immediate crisis in the place to be
searched and there was a probability that police assistance
would aid in alleviating the crisis.J
In this case, the court found that the officers reasonably be-
lieved that the defendant had dynamite based on the facts sup-









'I"A at 1090 (quoting People v. Malczewski, 744 P.2d 62, 66 (Colo. 1987)).
380 Id.
5" Id. at 1089.
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expertise in ascertaining the validity of bomb threats, that the
informant had proven reliable on prior occasions, and that her
information was corroborated when an officer found a toggle
switch in the car.92 The court stated that when the officers
searched the defendant's car and found no explosives, the offi-
cers had probable cause to believe that the dynamite had been
moved to the apartment.5 93 This finding was supported by the
fact that the police observed the defendant carrying parcels into
the apartment approximately thirty minutes before his arrest'
4
Finally, the court found that the presence of the dynamite
posed a grave threat to persons in the area.5 95 All of these facts
together established that the entry was justified by the emer-
gency doctrine. 96
Similarly, in People v. Kane, the court found that officers had
reasonable grounds to believe an emergency existed involving
explosives. 97 In Kane, a landlord notified police when she
found a box of explosives in the garage of her apartment build-
ing.5 ~ The police arrived and ordered the area evacuated. 99
Next, they questioned the defendant's roommate. °  The
roommate explained that he had seen dynamite in the defen-
dant's bedroom closet two weeks earlier, but was unsure if the
defendant had removed it.6°1 The roommate also told police
that in their apartment, the defendant had weapons, ammuni-
tion, and newspaper clippings reporting bombing incidents.
602
Moreover, the roommate identified the box in the garage as
similar to the one he saw in the defendant's closet.603 In the














blasting caps, dynamite, and an accelerant which made the
situation extremely dangerous and unstable.m Police "con-
ducted a cursory, olfactory search for dynamite" after the
roommate gave consent, and observed the weapons and news-
paper clippings as described.6 The apartment was secured, but
nothing was seized.6 Police returned later and conducted a
more thorough search, pursuant to a warrant, during which
they seized the above items and additional explosives.W The de-
fendant challenged the entries and searches, but the appellate
court easily found that the officers acted pursuant to a reason-
able belief that an emergency was at hand.6
1) Presence of Ether or Other Volatile Chemicals
Some courts have also held that the emergency exception
allows police to conduct a warrantless search upon detecting po-
tentially explosive chemicals, including ether, which is often
used in manufacturing or processing narcotics. For example, in
People v. Clements, the Supreme Court of Colorado used the
emergency doctrine to uphold an automobile search, which was
primarily based on the odor of ether emanating from an auto-
mobile.w In this case, an officer observed the defendant put
something in the trunk of a car, turn and look at the officer,
slam the trunk shut, and then hurry inside.60 As the officer
rode by the trunk, he detected a strong odor of ether.61 1 Fur-
ther, he was aware that the defendant had a history of manufac-
turing narcotics. 612 The officer entered the building to question
the defendant, who admitted that the vehicle was his, but de-
nied that any ether was in the trunk.618 When the officer asked
006 Id.
W07 id.
6wS Id. Since the search was validated under the emergency exception, the court
did not consider whether the roommate's consent was valid. Id.








to search the car, the defendant refused and indicated that he
wanted to contact his lawyer.1 Shortly thereafter, the defen-
dant left for that purpose.1
As the officer waited by the car, another individual soon ap-
proached the vehicle and attempted to move it.616 The officer
demanded the keys and opened the trunk. 7 He found a bottle
of ether, lab equipment, and other chemicals used to manufac-
ture narcotics.6 18  The car was subsequently impounded and
searched pursuant to a warrant, during which narcotics were
found in the glove compartment of the automobile.61 9 During
the defendant's trial for several narcotics violations, the trial
court suppressed the evidence seized during the search, ruling
that the officer used the emergency exception as a pretext for
opening the trunk that tainted the subsequent search of the
620car.
The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed, ruling that the
officer acted reasonably to avert a possible public safety hazard,
and sustained the search under the emergency exception.6 21 It
emphasized the reasonableness of the officer's belief that the
ether was unstable and could unexpectedly explode. 62 These
beliefs were corroborated by expert testimony that an explosion
could occur from minor jostling, heat, sparks, or even radio
transniissions.62 The court also noted that the car was near an
occupied apartment building, and that the incident occurred
on a hot summer evening.6 24 Moreover, the court stated that the






619 I& at 269-70.
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of the chemicals later, although the officer could also have
called a bomb squad to take care of the matter at the scene. 62
In a similar case a neighbor of the defendant called the po-
lice when he was awakened at approximately 12:30 AM. by what
he identified as a chemical odor.6 6 Following a forty-five minute
drive to the location, which was situated in a remote area, the
responding officers recognized the unusual smell as that of
ether.627 The officers verified that the smell was coming from
the defendants' cabin and summoned the fire department.
62
Two and one-half to three hours later, the officers entered the
cabin with their guns drawn.629 During a search of the premises,
they located and arrested three individuals. Once the suspects
were in custody, the police re-entered the premises, aided by the
firefighters, and took precautions to alleviate the existing fire
hazard.63' While doing so, the officers found cocaine, as well as
chemicals and equipment used to manufacture narcotics.
0 2
The court found that the officers' beliefs, namely, that the
cabin constituted a fire hazard and that narcotics were being
manufactured on the premises, were reasonable in light of the
strong chemical odor."5 In addition, the court emphasized the
odor coming from the cabin,6s the time of day, the area in
which the cabin was located, and the possible lack of immediate
availability of firefighting resources.m Accordingly, the court
6 ,' Id- This illustrates the familiar doctrine that law enforcement officials need not
employ the least restrictive means of accomplishing a result. Illinois v. LaFayette, 462
U.S. 640, 647-48 (1983) (police not required to use least intrusive alternative during
inventory of defendant's personal effects during police booking of defendant follow-
ing defendant's arrest).
"6 United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271, 1273 (9th Cir. 1996).
" IA at 1273-74.
Id. at 1274.










ruled that "exigent circumstances" existed to justify the officers'
entry.'
This court included the emergency doctrine within the
definition of exigent circumstances, when the concepts actually
provide alternative arguments.37 Instead of combining the two
doctrines, the court could have based its holding on the emer-
gency exception if convinced not only that the officers reasona-
bly believed an emergency existed, but also that the motive and
scope elements of the test set out in this article were met.6, In-
stead, the court confused the issues needlessly by focusing on
exigent circumstances.
The Ninth Circuit distinguished Echegoyen in a later case
where it declined to apply the emergency exception in a situa-
tion involving highly volatile chemicals.6 9 In United States v.
Warner, a landlord was making repairs to the premises he rented
to the defendant when he noticed a box of chemicals in the ga-
rage." The landlord made a list of the chemicals and sought
the advice of a chemist who concluded that they posed no dan-
ger."4 Approximately four weeks later, the landlord returned to
mow the lawn, when he noticed a pungent chemical smell.
Concerned because of the high temperature that day, he called
the police but stated that the situation was not an emergency."3
Two hours later, an officer anived.6" The landlord pro-
ceeded to show the officer the list of chemicals, which included
'6 1d. at 1279.
0" Id. at 1278. See supra Part II.C for a discussion of a court's unnecessary reliance
on law enforcement rather than community caretaking principles.
It seems unlikely that the officers' actions would pass muster under the three
prong test suggested in this article. Specifically, the officers would likely fail to satisfy
the motive prong because of the six hour delay, after which they entered with their
guns drawn. These facts suggest an intent to investigate criminal activity, namely
manufacturing narcotics, more than an intent to prevent a chemical explosion. See
infra Part U.B for a discussion of the importance of an officer's motivation.
639 See United States v. Warner, 843 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1988).










ether and formaldehyde.6 The officer was aware that these
chemicals were used to manufacture narcotics, and asked to en-
ter the garage.6 After visually inspecting the chemicals, the of-
ficer called the fire department and a narcotics officer.4 7 After
a search, the officials seized several items from the garage and
the house.m The defendant challenged the entry as a violation
of the Fourth Amendment, and the Ninth Circuit agreed.69
The court emphasized that no emergency existed based on
the facts known to the officer at the time of the entry. The
court distinguished this case from Echegoyen in which the officers
called the fire department and were informed of the danger
prior to their entry.65 In contrast, here, the officer was aware
that the landlord discovered the chemicals at least two weeks
earlier and was unaware of any explosive potential before he en-
tered the premises. 5' In addition, the court stated that "there
was no basis for believing that any illicit activity was actually tak-
ing place on the premises; no occupants were present"e 5 2 and
"similarly no basis for believing that suspects or evidence might
disappear."5  Thus, the court held that the search was not justi-
fied under the emergency doctrine because the facts known to
the officer at the time he entered did not give rise to a reason-
able belief that an emergency existed.6 One judge dissented,
stating that since the officer was aware of the explosive nature of
the chemicals, the entry was justified to alleviate the threat










Id. at 405-06 (Brunetti,J., dissenting).
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3. Remaining Ambiguities: Stretching "Immediacy" and Protection of "Mere
Property Concerns"
As in any working model, there are areas in emergency ex-
ception analysis which continue to raise questions. For example,
while this prong of the three-factor test proposed in this article
suggests there is an element of immediacy required in situations
where the emergency doctrine is applied,s this requirement is
not always strictly enforced. Immediacy should not be con-
strued as a set time period within which the officer must act,
rather, it should be assessed in the context of the factual situa-
tion. As mentioned above, depending on the type of situation
the officer encounters, what is considered an immediate re-
sponse may vary widely. Generally, officers must make their ini-
tial warrantless entry into the home or commercial building
immediately after realizing an emergency is at hand. Under
some circumstances though, courts have allowed police to delay
their initial entry. In these cases, police may be facing either an
ongoing emergency, such as a kidnapping, or gathering facts to
determine whether assistance is truly needed, such as in a miss-
ing persons case.. If there is a reasonable explanation for the of-
ficer's delay, the entry, even though delayed, will most likely be
construed as lawful under the emergency exception. 7
In addition, there remains little question as to whether the
emergency exception model proposed in this article can be
used solely for the protection of property. While it is clear that
the emergency exception is properly used for the protection of
life, not all jurisdictions have explicitly extended the exception
to the protection of any property interest standing alone. The
United States Supreme Court's dictum in Michigan v. Tyler, that
a "burning building clearly presents an exigency of sufficient
proportions to render a warrantless entry 'reasonable,"' strongly
implies at least significant property interests are protected."s
616 See United States v. Bute, 43 F.3d 531, 537-39 (10th Cir. 1994) (stressing impor-
tance of "immediacy" requirement).
17 See, e.g., U.S. v. Echegoyen 799 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1986) (court upheld warrant-
less entry under exigent circumstances despite the fact that officers were on the
premises for approximately two and one-half to three hours before they entered the
home).
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978).
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More importantly, it should be noted that while this issue may
raise interesting theoretical questions about the appropriateness
of government action where protection of property is the sole
basis of an emergency search, these questions raise very little
practical application concern because almost every situation in-
volving property addressed in the appellate decisions can also
be justified as involving the protection of life. Further, some of
those situations may be best resolved under the traditional non-
emergency exigent circumstances analysis.
One case applied the emergency exception in the context
of protecting the lives of animals. 659 In State v. Bauer, a Humane
Society officer investigated, over the course of about one year,
repeated complaints about conditions on the defendants'
farm.6 Then, in March, 1984, the owner of the property called
and asked the Humane Society officer for assistance in remov-
ing a horse that had recently died on the property.661 The Hu-
mane Society officer arranged for an equine specialist, Dr.
Cook, to meet her and a police officer at the property.662 When
they arrived, they found the dead horse in the defendants'
driveway&6 Dr. Cook determined that the horse had died of
starvation.6
The officials then proceeded to the barn where they found
other horses standing in solid manure, without feed or bed-
ding.6 Dr. Cook determined that the overall condition of the
horses was very unhealthy and two were near death.m The Hu-
mane Society officer seized the horses and transported ten of
them to a nearby ranch the following day. 7 The remaining two
horses were moved one day later.m The defendants were con-
victed of mistreating animals, failing to provide sufficient food










and water to confined animals, and violating minimum space
and sanitation requirements for animals.6 The defendants,
claimed that all information about the animal abuse was gained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that the trial court
erred in refusing to suppress it.67
The court of appeals held that viewing the dead horse in
the driveway did not amount to a search because the defendants
had no expectation of privacy in a common area that was gen-
erally made accessible to visitors.67 Further, the government ar-
gued that the officials were justified in entering the barn under
the emergency doctrine.672 The court agreed, stating that ren-
dering aid to relatively helpless animals was a sufficient interest
to invoke the emergency exception.67 3 The court concluded
that the Humane Society officer reasonably believed that other
horses were in immediate jeopardy, emphasizing that the officer
was familiar with the defendants' previous violations, witnessed
the autopsy of the dead horse, and viewed other horses from
where she stood in the driveway.674 Thus, the court was con-
vinced that she acted reasonably in response to a compelling
need to "stop the ongoing suffering of the animals."675
B. PRONG TWO: POLICE MUST BE MOTIVATED BYAN INTENT TO
AID
The second prong, the one which lies at the heart of the
emergency doctrine, is motivation. This means that an officer
must act primarily for the purpose of achieving a community
caretaking function, rather than pursuing a law enforcement
objective. 76 The officer should be motivated by a good faith de-
sire to aid a person in need, prevent harm, or to protect signifi-
w49 Id.
6' Id. at 898.
6n Id.
m Id. at 898-99.
674 Im
67 Id. at 899.
676Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973); Commonwealth v. Waters, 456
S.E.2d 527,530 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
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cant property interests.67 While the second prong focuses on
the officer's subjective intent, this action, of course, must also be
objectively reasonable in order to satisfy prong one of the test
proposed in this article. This motivational requirement distin-
guishes the emergency exception from most other exceptions to
the warrant requirement where the officer's primary focus is on
crime solving, such as when the officer acts to preserve evidence
or catch a fleeing suspect. While it is unnecessary that this
community caretaking motive be the only motive in an officer's
mind at the time of the warrantless entry, it is essential that the
desire to aid or protect be a primary, or at least a substantial,
part of the officer's good faith subjective motivation. It is quite
conceivable that an officer engaging in a warrantless search may
simultaneously have dual motives for his or her actions, but as
long as one of these motives corresponds with an objectively
reasonable emergency, as defined in the first prong, then the
emergency doctrine is applicable.
The following hypotheticals will illustrate the distinction be-
tween the objective emergency requirement of the first prong
and the subjective motivation requirement of the second prong.
A police officer on routine patrol hears a bloodcurdling scream
coming from inside a private residence. Objectively this quali-
fies as an emergency. It is reasonable for the officer to believe
that someone inside is in immediate need of assistance. How-
ever, this objective finding alone is not enough to sidestep the
warrant requirement. Further analysis is necessary to examine
the officer's subjective response to the scream. In other words,
which hat is the officer wearing when he enters the residence?
Is he wearing his law enforcement hat, his community caretak-
ing hat, or both? Consider the following thoughts of the officer:
1) "Someone must be hurt, I need to help," 2) "Someone must
be hurt, I need to help the victim and arrest the attacker," or 3)
"There is always someone screaming inside that house. I'm sure
nothing's wrong, but now is my chance to confirm my suspi-
cions that drug deals are going on inside." An officer acting
under the first motivation is acting properly under the emer-
vn People v. Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d 607, 609-10 (N.Y. 1976). See infra Part mH.D for a
complete discussion of this case.
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gency doctrine. The second motivation, which is a dual com-
munity caretaking/law enforcement motive, is most likely also
acceptable. The third motivation is clearly not a proper use of
the emergency doctrine. The officer needs to be actually en-
gaged in community caretaking, not merely using an emergency
situation as a pretext for other motives.
However, at least one court has opted to disregard what this
author considers to be the central component of the emergency
doctrine. In State v. Carlson, the Iowa Supreme Court held that
it would no longer apply the motivation prong in emergency
doctrine analysis. In the case, officers responded to a missing
person report from a daughter who was concerned about the
safety of her mother.67 The mother had been living with the
defendant, who had previously abused her. ° The daughter
grew concerned when she did not hear from her mother for two
days and the defendant offered her conflicting explanations
about the mother's whereabouts.6' In response to the daugh-
ter's report, police went to the defendant's house to investi-
gate.6 The police searched the residence and found the
defendant asleep in his bedroom and the mother's body in the
basement.~3 The defendant was arrested and charged with
murder.6 The police then secured a warrant and made a com-
plete search of the house.6 The defendant moved to suppress
the results of the initial warrantless entry.6 The district court
upheld the search and defendant appealed. 7
The Supreme Court of Iowa denied the defendant's motion
based on the emergency exception.6 The court found that un-
der the circumstances, an objectively reasonable emergency ex-
678 548 N.W.2d 138, 141-42 (Iowa 1996).
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isted.6 While the court acknowledged that the actions of the
officers would also meet the subjective motivational prong pre-
viously used in emergency exception cases, the court decided
that this part of the analysis should be abandoned.m The court
decided to rely solely on an objective test by analogizing to the
objective tests employed in Iowa in other contexts, such as in
vehicle impoundment and pretextual arrests.61 The court fur-
ther stated that "the officers' subjective thinking processes are
not satisfactorily susceptible of proof or disproof."O2 While it is
true that it may not always be easy to prove the mental state of
another person, this is no reason to dismiss an element so essen-
tial to the emergency doctrine and that which makes it a unique
concept. There are numerous other instances where courts are
required to make similar judgments of a person's subjective
thinking processes, such as in cases requiring a factual finding
of "specific intent" to commit a crime6 3 or a "good faith" belief
that certain conduct is legal.m
Notwithstanding Carlson, the following are some examples
of cases from other jurisdictions where the motivation prong
was a key factor in the emergency doctrine analysis. In People v.
Meddows, the court upheld a police seizure of dynamite, which
later was used by the state to connect a defendant to a bombing-
murder, where the seizure arose from the police officer's con-
cern about the presence of children in defendant's trailer-home
who might be endangered by dynamite in the same home. 5 In
Meddows, the defendant and his step-father were hunting along
a creek bed, when a dynamite-encased booby trap exploded and





"s See, e.g., People v. McManus, 555 N.E.2d 391, 399 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990) (circumstantial evidence supported specific intent required for theft by decep-
tion); 1 JOHN DECKER, ILLINOIS CRIMINAL LAW: A SURVEY OF CRIMES AND DEFENSES, §2-29
(2d ed. 1995) (describing Illinois courts' reliance on circumstantial evidence in assess-
ing proof of defendant's criminal intent).
See, e.g., United States v. Leon 468 U.S. 897 (1984).




about the incident two days later at the sheriff's office, a relative
of defendant and his deceased step-father advised the authori-
ties that "Mr. Meddows" had dynamite and blasting caps in the
home where defendant and the step-father had lived.' 7 Also,
the relative revealed that small children, who were relatives of
the step-father, were staying in the home while in town to attend
the victim's funeral. 8 This information mistakenly suggested
that the dynamite belonged to the step-father rather than the
defendant.m Thereafter, officials retrieved the explosives
which, in fact, belonged to the defendant and implicated him in
the murder of his step-father.700
The court upheld the official's warrantless entry because of
the emergency circumstances created by the presence of the
highly dangerous blasting caps and dynamite in the same home
as the small children, who might accidentally detonate them.7 °'
The court held that if police reasonably believe an emergency
exists, their warrantless entry into private premises is justified if
its "purpose-to offer assistance to a citizen possibly imperiled,
not to obtain evidence of a crime" is the official's goal.702 Here,
the official who learned of the presence of the dynamite "testi-
fied unequivocally that the purpose of searching the trailer was
to protect the young children in it from possible harm."7 3
Moreover, when he learned about the explosives in defendant's
home, he assumed the dynamite belonged to the victim, rather
than the defendant, which corroborated the conclusion that the
search was not motivated by seizing evidence implicating defen-
dant in criminality.704
In Reynolds v. Commonwealth, the court upheld a warrantless
entry into a private residence in circumstances where the officer





0 Id. at 221.
70 Id at 222.
" Id. at 221-22.




ment motive.75 In Reynolds, an officer discovered stolen items
and guns in a stopped vehicle.70 The driver of the vehicle con-
fessed that he had just stolen the items in a burglary of the de-
fendant's residence.707 The officer arrested the driver and then
took the driver to the defendant's residence to investigate.7 08
The officer suspected that the driver may have injured or killed
someone during the course of the burglary.709 In addition, the
officer wanted to secure evidence of the illegal breaking and en-
tering inside the house.710 The driver-burglar showed the officer
the screen porch where he had entered the defendant's
home.7 11 The burglar also pointed out twenty-nine marijuana
plants growing there. The officer contacted vice investigators
who seized the plants.713 The officer then waited for the defen-
dant's wife to return and gained her consent to a complete
search of the house. 4 During this search, the officer saw co-
caine in plain view.7n The defendant and his wife were charged
with the illicit manufacture of marijuana and cocaine posses-
sion.716
The court upheld the trial court's denial of the defendants'
motions to suppress the drug evidence by using what it called
the "emergency doctrine." The court found that the officer
was acting in good faith in an effort to possibly aid the victims of
the burglary and secure their property.1 8 Although the officer
was also acting under a law enforcement motivation in his inten-
tion to preserve the evidence of the breaking and entering, the
court found that there was no evidence that the emergency was










71 Id. at 661-62.
4 Id. at 662.
715id.
716 Id.
77 Id. at 663-64.
78 Id. at 664.
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used merely as a pretext to achieve only law enforcement
goals.
719
In People v. Guins, the defendant's convictions for cocaine
possession and drug paraphernalia possession were reversed
when the court found that police were acting with a law en-
forcement motive rather than a community caretaking motive at
the point where they first entered the defendant's apartment70
In this case, firefighters were called to the defendant's apart-
ment to put out a fire.721 While examining the apartment for
damage, a fire investigator found empty glassine envelopes and
an undamaged locked security box.7 The investigator sus-
pected that the box might contain contraband, so he informed
the police.7' Within the hour, a police officer arrived at the
apartment to investigate the box.74 The responding officer was
unable to open the box.7 He then ordered an evidence tech-
nician to photograph the box and take it to the police station.76
No other items were removed from the apartment.7 At the po-
lice station, the box was opened, and cocaine was discovered in-
side.78  At the time of the seizure, the fire had been
extinguished and police guards secured the building.m
The court found that the protection of property of victims
of a residential fire was a legitimate exercise of governmental
authority.73° However, in this case, the officer acknowledged
that he entered the apartment and seized the box, not to pro-
tect the owner's property, but because there might have 'been
evidence of a crime inside.71 Since the officer's motive was to
seize evidence of a crime, the emergency doctrine did not ap-
719 
Id.
72 569 N.Y.S.2d 541,543-44 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
* 1Id. at 541.
M id.
'm Id. at 541-42.
72Id.
72'Id. at 542.








ply.7 32 The court held that the warrantless seizure of the secu-
rity box was not justified and, thus, the appellate court sup-
pressed the drug evidence and dismissed the indictment against
the defendant.
7 33
C. PRONG THREE: POLICE ACTION MUST FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE
OF THE EMERGENCY
This section discusses the scope of the emergency doctrine
with respect to areas that may be searched,M including initial
entries into private premises by responding officers, subsequent
entries, and actions that police may take once inside. First, po-
lice may only enter an area at a time when they reasonably be-
lieve their assistance is needed,7- and that area must have a
proximate connection with the perceived emergency.7m In addi-
tion, once police enter premises to address an emergency, their
authority is limited to alleviating the emergency at hand .7 7 This
includes not only conducting a search of the premises to search
for persons in need of aid, but also a protective sweep to ensure
that no further danger is present.7 During this time, police
may also seize any evidence of criminality in plain view.78 9 In no
case does the emergency doctrine give the police authority to
conduct an exhaustive search of the premises for evidence of a
crime. Thus, once the police alleviate the emergency and the
premises are secure, further searches are impermissible.741 Any
subsequent entries made after the emergency has ended must
7 Id.
" Id. at 543-44.
7" Throughout this section, "areas" or "premises" includes residences, commercial
buildings, motor vehicles, and persons.
7 People v. Mitchell 347 N.E.2d 607, 609 (N.Y. 1976).
7Mid.
' Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978). But cf. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S.
499, 510 (1978) (stating that officials may remain a reasonable time after the emer-
gency has been alleviated to investigate the cause of a blaze).
'm Mince, 437 U.S. at 392; Tykr, 436 U.S. at 509-10.
' Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393; Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509.
State v. Illig, 467 N.W.2d 375, 381 (Neb. 1991).
7, See, e.g., United States v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir.
1972) (although police entry of hotel room in search of possibly wounded man was
proper, subsequent search of suitcase in room after officer determined that no one
was present in room illegal).
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be accompanied by a valid warrant,742 assuming no other excep-
tions to the warrant requirement apply at that time." While
these rules outline the scope of the emergency exception, the
section below illustrates just how far they have been stretched in
particular situations.
1. Area Searched Must Have a Connection to the Emeigency
If an officer reasonably believes that a person or property is
in need of immediate protection, that officer may enter only the
area where she reasonably believes the emergency is taking
place 7" or which is somehow connected to the emergency.
74
Often this will not pose any significant dilemma because the
facts that give rise to the emergency, whether reported or ob-
served, will also guide the officer directly to the site of the
emergency. Difficulties arise, however, in cases involving emer-
gencies such as missing or unconscious persons. For instance,
in State v. Follett, a police officer observed the defendant driving
in an erratic manner in a grocery store parking lot.746 The offi-
cer stopped the defendant, and arrested him for driving under
the influence. 74 7 The defendant was then taken to the police
station.7" He did not have any identification and was acting very
strangely749 The arresting officer concluded from his erratic
behavior that the defendant was suffering from a cocaine over-
dose.7 0 The arresting officer then went back to the grocery
store parking lot where defendant's car was situated and
searched the defendant's car to determine what the defendant
had ingested.7 ' The search of the car, which the court expressly
stated was not motivated by an intent to arrest or seize evidence,
7* See, e.g., Tyler, 436 U.S. at 501-03, 511 (warrantless re-entry two weeks after fire
extinguished unconstitutional).
74 See supra notes 12-22 and accompanying text for a listing of warrant exceptions.
714 People v. Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d. 607, 609 (N.Y. 1976).
74' This, of course, presupposes that the police are acting without a warrant and
that no other exceptions to the warrant requirement apply at the time.










was upheld because the officer had a reasonable belief that the
area (the defendant's car) had a connection to the emergency
(the defendant's possible cocaine overdose), and was the place
where the cocaine would most likely be found. 2
In contrast, in United States v. Goldenstein, the police re-
sponded to a report of a fight at a hotel.753 An officer observed a
man, lying on the floor of the hotel, with a grave gunshot
wound.754 The desk clerk told the officer that a second
wounded man, the defendant, had gone upstairs to his room af-
ter the fight carrying a gun.75 The officer knocked on the door
of the defendant's room, but received no answer, so the officer
had the clerk open the door.7s The officer searched the room,
but the defendant was not there. 7 Next, the police searched a
closed suitcase in the room and observed currency in the suit-
case that tied the defendant to the crime of aggravated bank
robbery.78 The court found the officer's entry into the room to
be reasonable, but determined the search of the suitcase to be
unreasonable and, as a result, ruled that the currency found in
the suitcase was inadmissible since the suitcase had no connec-
tion to the emergency.7
2. Necessity of Initial Enthy
Since the purpose of the emergency exception is to allow
police to provide immediate aid in situations where the safety of
persons or property is threatened, a delayed response not only
calls the officer's motivation into question,760 but it also falls out-
side the scope of the exception if the emergency has been alle-
viated. For instance, in Root v. Gauper, the court held that the
emergency doctrine did not validate the officers' warrantless en-
7
5
2 Id. at 1302-03.
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try into a residence when the officers knew the shooting victim
was already being transported to the hospital in an ambu-
lance.76' In that case, police had received a telephone call re-.1 762
porting a shooting in a residence. While on their way to the
scene of the shooting, they passed the ambulance that was carry-
ing the shooting victim.763 The ambulance driver radioed to the
police officers that he had removed the injured party from the
residence and was on the way to the hospital.7 4 There were no
facts to indicate that any others were injured in the residence. 76
The ambulance driver never mentioned any other victims and
the police officers did not see anyone wounded outside the
residence.76 Additionally, the officers waited for back-up before
going into the residence,767 and the fact that they had a camera
for taking pictures of the scene of the shooting indicated that
the officers were looking for evidence of a crime and were not
solely motivated by a desire to alleviate the emergency situa-
tion.7' Thus, although there clearly was an emergency situation
initially because of the shooting, the officers could not make a
warrantless entry after the emergency was alleviated. Obviously,
these circumstances fell outside the scope of the emergency
doctrine and, in addition, failed to meet the first prong of the
test proposed in this article: that officers must reasonably be-
lieve someone is in need of aid.
3. Subsequent Entries
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of the scope of the emer-
gency doctrine is determining the extent to which subsequent
entries are lawful. This article defines subsequent entries as any
entry made after that of the initial responding officer or offi-
cers. They range from the clearly lawful "continuation" of the
initial entry which occurs when other officials, officers, or spe-
7" 438 F.2d 361, 364"65 (8th Cir. 1971).7612 Id. at 363.
763 id.







cialists arrive at the scene shortly after the initial responding of-
ficers have entered76 to the clearly unlawful warrantless entry
made several days after the emergency has been alleviated."0
Since many cases involve several warrantless entries made by
various officers, courts are forced to decide when subsequent
entries cease to fall under the so-called "continuation doctrine"
and, as such, become unlawful. Not surprisingly, there is no
magic timeline or number of entries at which the line can be
drawn; rather, the line shifts depending on the particular facts
of each case.
The United States Supreme Court addressed the scope of
the general emergency exception in Mincey v. Arizona.r" In this
case, an undercover narcotics agent, Officer Headricks, ar-
ranged a drug deal with the defendant and arrived at his apart-
ment with the money. 2 When the door opened, Officer
Headricks entered the apartment and quickly proceeded to the
bedroom.7  Several other officers, who had accompanied
Headricks, rushed into the defendant's apartment and heard a
volley of gunshots coming from the bedroom. 4 Officer Head-
ricks was fatally wounded, and an acquantence of Mincey's in
the apartment was also injured as a result of the gunfire."5 The
officers at the scene who had not sustained injuries immediately
summoned medical assistance and then searched the apartment
to locate all of the injured persons.77 6 Homicide detectives ar-
rived at the scene within a few minutes and took over the inves-
tigation!m Once all of the shooting victims were removed, the
homicide detectives began to gather evidence.7n Over the
course of the next four days, the detectives performed an "ex-
' See, e.g., State v. Mincey, 636 P.2d 637 (Ariz. 1981).
7" See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (warrantless re-entry for investi-
gation of arson four days after fire is held unconstitutional).
7' 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
72 Id. at 387.
M d.
M4 Id.
7n Id. at 387-88.
"' Id. at 388.
*n Id. at 388-89.
7m Id. at 389.
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haustive and intrusive [warrantless] search" of the crime
scene.m The defendant moved to exclude all of the evidence
gathered during the search, arguing that the detectives' war-
rantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment.7w
In analyzing this case, the Court recognized that the Fourth
Amendment does not bar warrantless entries when police rea-
sonably believe a person is in need of aid,781 but added that any
"warrantless search must be 'strictly circumscribed by the exi-
gencies which justify its initiation' and it simply cannot be con-
tended that this search was justified by any emergency
threatening life or limb. "r While the Court clearly held that
the scope of the emergency exception was limited to alleviating
the emergency at hand, and that the detectives' four day search
continued too long, it did not state that the detectives' entry in
and of itself was unlawful, nor did it decide exactly where the
detectives crossed the line. Instead, the Court remanded the
case to the Arizona Supreme Court for a determination as to
which evidence, if any, was gathered unlawfully.78
On remand, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the of-
ficers who attempted to assist Headricks entered the apartment
lawfully under the emergency doctrine.m It continued that the
detectives' entry constituted a continuation of the initial entry
and was, therefore, within the scope of the emergency excep-
tion.78 The court reasoned that the detectives arrived shortly af-
ter the shooting, even before the injured persons within the
apartment were taken to the hospital, and that the officers in-
volved in the incident were precluded from investigating the
"' Id. The detectives searched drawers, cupboards, closets, and clothes, removed
sections of the carpets, dug bullet fragments out of the walls, and photographed and
diagrammed the entire apartment. Id.
m Id.
7' Id. at 392.
Id. at 393 (quoting Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968) (citation omitted)).
" Id. at 395 n.9.
State v. Mincey, 636 P.2d. 637 (Ariz. 1981).
Id. at 649. The court held that Headrick's entry was unlawful because he failed
to knock and announce. Id. It continued that the other officers' lawful entry under
the emergency exception sufficiently purged Officer Headrick's illegal entry, thus




scene pursuant to a police department policy.787 Thus, all evi-
dence in plain view was subject to seizure by the detectives.m
The court also went on to hold that the evidence seized during
the subsequent entries by the detectives over the next four days
were admissible not because these entries were considered a
valid continuation of the initial entry, but rather because they
fell within the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.7 9
The court stated that the detectives had not procured a warrant
because they reasonably believed they were operating under
Arizona's "murder scene exception."m
Since Mincey, many courts have agreed that when police law-
fully enter premises under the emergency exception, subse-
quent entries by other officers, usually to provide backup
support or special expertise, occurring while the initial respond-
ing officers are still on the scene is a continuation of the initial
entry and, as such, the officers' subsequent entries are consid-
ered to be within the scope of the emergency exception.7' Fur-
ther, any officials who enter premises under the "continuation
doctrine" are subject to the same limitations in regards to ad-
dressing the emergency as are the initial responding, officers.72
Courts have also made it clear that while officers are limited to
seizing evidence in plain view, they may continue to seize or
m7 Id.
W id.
" Id. at 650 n.2.
m Id. at 650. The lead detective asked a county attorney whether he needed to
procure a warrant to search the premises, and the attorney replied that he did not so
long as he did not leave the premises. Id.
"' Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511 (1978) (holding under the circumstances of
the case, the limited visibility due to smoke, the early morning hours, and the re-entry
occurring a short time after the first entry, that the second entry was just a continua-
tion of the first, and was thereby valid); United States v. Boetteger, 71 F.3d 1410, 1416
(8th Cir. 1995) (re-entry by authorities with special expertise in addressing explosives
two days after initial entry by local firefighters upheld due to continuing danger to
public safety presented by explosive chemicals and destructive explosives found in de-
fendant's apartment); State v. Magnano, 528 A.2d 760, 764 (Conn. 1987) (finding that
when law enforcement officers enter private premises to respond to a call for help,
and during the response see but do not seize evidence observed in plain view, the of-
ficers may re-enter to seize the evidence).
See Boetteger, 71 F.3d at 1414-15 (each official who entered or re-entered defen-
dant's apartment "did so to ascertain the cause of the explosion and detect other de-
vices which could explode.").
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process such evidence even after the emergency has been allevi-
ated.75 Some courts have allowed officers to re-enter premises
without a warrant to retrieve observed evidence that was not
seized during the initial entry.74
Since officers are required to leave the premises after the
emergency has been alleviated except when seizing evidence al-
ready observed under the plain view doctrine, the question be-
comes at what point do entries lawfully made pursuant to the
emergency exception become unreasonable? The Supreme
Court addressed this issue in Michigan v. Tyler. In Tyler, the
Court held that firefighters and police officers could enter a
burning building due to emergency in order to extinguish a
fire. In addition, the Court held that officials could re-enter
the premises without a warrant within a reasonable time after
the fire had been extinguished since they had been forced to
evacuate the premises during their initial entry and terminate
their investigation of the fire due to the dense smoke and the
darkness of the early morning hour. The Court noted, how-
ever, that while officials can normally remain on the premises or
re-enter the premises for a reasonable time after the fire has
been extinguished to determine the fire's cause, all subsequent
re-entries need to be accompanied by a warrant.797 The Court
explained that what constitutes "a reasonable time after the
emergency" depends on the particular facts of each case, as well
as the "individual's reasonable expectations of privacy."' ' 8
In Tyler, firefighters had extinguished a fire in commercial
premises but were unable to complete their investigation into its
cause due to dense smoke and darkness of the early morning
hour. The officials re-entered the premises four hours later to
People v. Harper, 902 P.2d 842, 845 (Colo. 1995) (holding that "any object that
comes into view during such a search may... be preserved without a warrant pursu-
ant to the plain-view doctrine.").
People v. Reynolds, 672 P.2d 529, 531 (Colo. 1983) (holding that "a search war-
rant is not required where evidence discovered in plain view is seized as part of a con-
tinuing police investigation."); Magnano, 528 A.2d at 764 (citing Tyler, 436 U.S. at
499).
79 436 U.S. at 509.
Id. at 510-11.
Id. at 511.
Id. at 510 n.6.
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determine the exact cause of the fire, although arson was sus-
pected.7 In addition, the police had re-entered the premises
several more times over a three week period without either a
search warrant or consent. Subsequently, the Supreme Court
found that the re-entry four hours after the officials had extin-
guished the fire was valid under the particular circumstances of
this case.m The Court, however, ruled that each of the later re-
entries violated the Fourth Amendment because they were too
detached from the initial emergency to fall within the emer-
gency exception."° The Court explained that since a reasonable
time had passed, police were required to secure either an ad-
ministrative search warrant, if re-entry was necessary to deter-
mine the cause of the fire, or a criminal search warrant, if re-
entry was necessary to gather evidence of arson or other
crimes.8 '
In the later case of Michigan v. Clifford, the Supreme Court
reiterated both the "reasonable time afterward" proposition, as
well as the need for an administrative or criminal search warrant
for subsequent entries.ss 3 In that case, firefighters were called to
fight a fire at the defendant's residence. The firefighters left
the premises once the fire was extinguished around 7:00 A.M.805
They later notified the police that they suspected arson was to
blame.0 When the police arrived at about 1:00 P.M., insurance
investigators were already boarding up the house at the request
of the defendant.87 The police entered the premises and, upon
gaining entry into the basement, they smelled the odor of fuel.
This led them to a crock-pot beneath the basement stairs that
Id. at 502, 511.
I& at 511.
'o' Id. Police and firefighters had extinguished the fire by 4:00 A.M., and made
sure that it would not rekindle. They then departed before finishing their customary
investigation, only because the darkness and smoke made such an investigation too
difficult. Thus, it was reasonable for them to return in the early morning to complete
their duties.
02Id. at 508.
Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984).
Id. at 289.





was wired to an electronic timer. The officers determined that.
the fire originated in the basement, and then continued to
search the upstairs portion of the house, including opening
drawers and closets.m This extensive search led to additional
evidence of arson. The defendants claimed that all evidence
should have been suppressed because it was obtained in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment.m The government argued that,
in light of Tyler, the search occurred within a reasonable time af-
ter the initial entry to extinguish the fire, and should be up-
held.810
The Supreme Court agreed with the defendants, stating
where "reasonable expectations of privacy remain in the fire
damaged property, additional investigations begun after the fire
has been extinguished... must be made pursuant to a warrant
or the identification of some new exigency."8 1' The Court found
this case distinguishable from Tyler on two grounds in holding
that the second entry was not just a continuation of the first.812
First, since the property at issue in the present case was a resi-
dence, the owners were entitled to a greater degree of privacy
than the owners of the commercial premises in Tyler.18 Second,
the defendants had taken measures to protect their privacy in-
terests by instructing their insurance company to secure the
house and board up the windows, which was done prior to the
police entry.
8 14
The government had also argued that the search was valid
because all searches to determine the cause of a fire should be
exempt from the administrative warrant requirement.8 5 The
Court rejected that argument, again recognizing the owner's
reasonable expectation of privacy even in fire-damaged prem-
ises. Thus, the officer should have obtained a warrant prior to
W0 8 id.
810 Id
81 Id. at 293.
8 Id. at 296-97.
813 Id.
8" Id. at 296.




entry, absent consent or some other applicable exception.1
The question then became, which type of warrant was required.
The Court held that officials who are seeking entry to deter-
mine the cause of the fire must get an administrative search
warrant. However, officials entering to search for evidence of
arson are required to procure a criminal search warrant."
Since the above cases clearly fall within the emergency doc-
trine, the difficulty arises in applying the third prong: What is
the permissible scope of the entries made to combat the fire?
Of course, this depends on the extent of the emergency. In the
above cases, the Supreme Court stated that officials may stay for
a reasonable time after the fire is extinguished, in order to ful-
fill their duty to investigate the cause of the blaze. 9 What con-
stitutes a reasonable time is determined by balancing the
owner's expectation of privacy with the government's interest in
investigating the cause of the blaze and ensuring that the prem-
ises no longer constitute a threat to public safety. In determin-
ing the owners' privacy interest, courts must take into account
the nature of the premises, commercial or residential, as well as
the extent of the damage, and any action the owner takes or
fails to take to safeguard his or her expectation of privacy after
the fire is extinguished. On the other hand, the court must
consider the government's duty to ensure that the fire is indeed
extinguished and to determine the cause of the fire so that it
does not recur. The above mentioned cases seem to represent
extreme scenarios in that the first, Tyler, involves commercial
premises with no action taken by the owner prior to the con-
tested entry, while the second, Clifford, involves residential
premises where the owners ordered the house boarded up prior
to the contested entry. Thus, there is leeway for lower courts to
decide what constitutes "a reasonable time after the fire is ex-
tinguished." Moreover, the question of whether this "reason-
able time afterwards" element applies in other contexts or is
limited to fires is also an open question.
"
7 Id. at 293.
" Id. at 294.
Michigan v. Tyler, 456 U.S. 499,510 (1978); Clifford, 464 U.S. at 291.
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In one lower court opinion, a warrantless entry into private
premises over six hours after a fire was upheld as being within a
"reasonable interval after the fire was extinguished."820 In that
case, firefighters responded to a fire in a residence. 1 The fire
was extinguished at 2:00 A.M. and all firefighting machinery was
removed around 5:00 A.M.8 2 At approximately 8:20 A.M., two
fire chiefs and two fire marshalls entered the home to investi-
gate the cause.8 2 The four officials concluded that the circum-
stances of the case indicated that the fire was the result of
arson. 24 The defendants had recently increased the fire insur-
ance in their home from $95,000 to $286,000, and the walls
were free of pictures though picture hooks remained on the
walls. 5 Two days later, the four officials searched the home
again without consent of the parties, though they informed the
defendants that an administrative warrant was on the way.
26
During this search, one of the fire chiefs found evidence of an
accelerant that had been placed in certain locations in the
basement in a manner that might lead investigators to mistak-
enly conclude that a water heater had started the blaze. 7 The
officials also noticed that some of the support beams in the
basement were missing and, consequently, concluded that the
facts established that the fire was the result of arson.8
The court upheld the initial search on the grounds that one
of the fire chiefs had arrived at the scene while the fire was still
being extinguished and had remained outside the residence un-
til he entered at approximately 8:20 A.M.82 In addition, the ini-
tial entry that occurred over six hours after the fire was
extinguished was made in connection with efforts to secure the
Commonwealth v.Jung, 651 N.E.2d 1211, 1216 (Mass. 1995).
821 Id. at 1214.
8n Id.
823id.







premises, and to investigate the cause of the blaze.m However,
the court invalidated the second entry that occurred two days
later on the grounds that the administrative warrant relied on
for that search lacked particularity and, consequently, denial of
the defendant's motion to suppress was vacated and re-
manded.01
4. Community Caretaking: Appropriate Scope of the Emergency Doctrine
Limiting the scope of the emergency doctrine by focusing
on, for example, proximity in time and place, strikes an appro-
priate balance between allowing police to thoroughly perform
their community caretaking functions and safeguarding indi-
viduals' Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures. In applying this prong, courts recognize
the unfortunate reality that in many instances, injury to persons
and property is the result of criminal activity.
Because this often becomes apparent to police during their
initial entry into private areas to address an emergency, this
prong allows police to seize any evidence in plain view and, if
necessary, to use any information gathered to later procure a
warrant, thereby contributing to the efficient and effective pur-
suit of solving criminality. On the other hand, courts must draw
a line between police actions carried out, at least in part, pursu-
ant to community caretaking responsibilities, and police actions
accomplished exclusively in pursuit of law enforcement duties.
If the various facts and circumstances in no way suggest the exis-
tence or continuance of an emergency situation, the broad legal
authority that government officials enjoy under the umbrella of
community caretaking cannot be invoked. Hence, courts must
recognize the very fact-based requirement that once an emer-
gency has been alleviated, police must now satisfy the various
constitutional standards faced by government officialdom in




D. CASE ILLUSTRATION OF THE THREE PRONG EMERGENCY
MODEL: PEOPLE v. MITCHELL
The cases that appeared above in the various sections or
subsections rarely, if ever, relied on the three-prong test pro-
posed in this article for identifying whether governmental ac-
tions carried out in the name of an emergency actually were
consistent with Fourth Amendment principles. However, it
should be noted that in 1976 the New York Court of Appeals
utilized this three factor analysis in the case of People v.
Mitchell.o2 Although the case was decided over twenty years ago,
the more sophisticated analysis it offers is still not followed in
most jurisdictions. 3 This case is offered as an excellent exam-
ple of both proper police conduct and correct application of all
three prongs of the emergency doctrine outlined above.
In Mitchell, a hotel maid had disappeared shortly after re-
porting to work. 4 A guest of the hotel reported the woman
missing when she had failed to deliver linens to her room.
8 5
The maid's street clothes were found on the sixth floor of the
hotel. After several employees attempted to locate the woman
with no success, the police were notified.8s Two officers arrived
on the scene and began to search for the woman.3 7 They began
by checking the vacant rooms, and then knocked on the doors
of the other rooms to ask the occupants about the woman.8m
During this investigation the officers knocked on the defen-
dant's door. The defendant permitted the officers to step in-
side his room at that time, but he stated that he had not seen
the woman. 9 The officers took a quick look around, and then
left his room.
832 347 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1976).
m But see Gallmayer v. State, 640 P.2d 837, 842 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (explicitly
adopting three-prong test from Mitchell); State v. Fisher, 686 P.2d 750, 760-61 (Ariz.
1984) (same); State v. Illig, 467 N.W.2d 375, 380 (Neb. 1991) (same); State v. Follett,
840 P.2d 1298, 1302 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (same).











Later that same day, when the woman could not be located,
a detective arrived and began a through search of the hotell 0
The detective searched the basement, roof, ducts, and alleyway
of the hotel. Finally, a room by room search was conducted.84
Eventually, the detective entered the defendant's room, using
the hotel's passkey and began a more thorough search." 2 The
detective noticed reddish brown stains on the carpet and wall of
the defendant's room.8" A closet door was open, and the
woman's body was found with her feet sticking out of a laundry
basket.8"
Following the state's successful prosecution of the defen-
dant for murder, he appealed the conviction based on the de-
tective's warrantless entry into his hotel room.8 " The court
properly used the emergency doctrine to deny the defendant's
motion to suppress.m First, the officers' belief that an emer-
gency situation existed was objectively reasonable.8 " The court
noted that the maid was missing for hours and that circum-
stances indicated that she could be somewhere in the hotel in
need of assistance.48 Second, the officers were acting under the
proper subjective motivation. The court noted that the entry
into the defendant's room was in response to the "emergency
situation and was not motivated by the intent to apprehend and
arrest him or to seize evidence."' 9 The officers were unsure
what had happened to the maid when they began their search.m
The officers were not acting with law enforcement motivations
because they did not know any crime had been comiitted"1








"' I& at 609-10.
'"Id. at 610.
"9 Id. at 609.




health and safety of the maid."52 Furthermore, the court ob-
served that even if the officers had considered the possibility of
foul play, it was not their primary motivation in searching the
defendant's room. 3 Lastly, the court held that the officers'
emergency search was proper in its scope.8 4 The officers had
properly searched all of the public areas of the hotel before be-
ginning to search the private rooms. In addition, the defen-
dant's room was on the sixth floor, the same floor where the
maid was last seen and her clothing was found."5
IV. CONCLUSION
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is complicated. This ar-
ticle was written with the hope that it could shed some light on
one piece of the puzzle, namely, where police act in response to
an emergency, under their community caretaking functions. In
contrast to police actions carried out in pursuit of their law en-
forcement functions, where a search and seizure is evaluated by
probable cause, whether the police had a warrant, or whether
an exception to the Fourth Amendment was applicable, the
community caretaking doctrine is only concerned with an
emergency where police act to protect human life or substantial
property interests from an immediate threat. By its very nature,
an emergency implies that there is no time to get ajudicial war-
rant and police must act quickly, for example, to save a kidnap-
ping victim or stop a fire from destroying a business.
This article proposes a three-prong test which may aid
courts in their determination of whether an emergency existed,
so that it can be determined whether police were acting within
their legitimate community caretaking functions. First, a police
officer must reasonably believe his or her assistance is needed
immediately to protect human life or substantial property inter-
ests. Second, the officer's acts must be based, at least in part, on
a subjective motivation to aid or protect life or property. Third,
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emergency, both in terms of the area to be searched and subse-
quent entries.
This three-prong test is not new. In fact, it has been in exis-
tence for more than twenty years, but it has not been utilized in
a majority ofjurisdictions. I believe this test is a helpful tool in
evaluating the emergency doctrine and hope that more courts
will begin using this test to illuminate one area of Fourth
Amendmentjurisprudence.
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